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The United States Senate

Report of Proceedings

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ON 2/15/77
BY BC

Hearing held before

Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities

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Thursday, June 19, 1975

Washington, D. C.

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over
to the Committee for destruction)

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C O N T E N T S

EXECUTIVE SESSION

- - -

Thursday, June 19, 1975

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United States Senate,

Select Committee to Study Government.

Operations with Respect to

Intelligence Activities,

Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:20 p.m., in Room S.123, The Capitol, Senator John G. Tower, presiding.

Present: Senators Tower (presiding), Baker and Mathias.

Also present: William Miller, Staff Director; Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr., Chief Counsel; Charles Kirbow and David Aaron, Professional Staff Members.

- - -

Senator Tower. Mr. Angleton, I understand that you came on very short notice. And I appreciate your accommodating the Committee.

YOu will have to be sworn.

Would you rise, please, and raise your right hand?

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give before this committee is the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Angleton. I do.

Senator Tower. Counsel, you may proceed.

TESTIMONY OF JAMES ANGLETON

Mr. Schwarz. I would like to first get your name and address on the record.

Mr. Angleton. James Angleton, Arlington, Virginia.

Mr. Schwarz. Just some procedural matters. You have a right to counsel, you understand that?

Mr. Angleton. Yes, I understand it.

Mr. Schwarz. And if at any time you want to stop to obtain counsel you have a right to do that. And if you wish to claim any of your Constitutional rights you have a right to do that, you understand those things also, do you?

Mr. Angleton. Yes, I understand them.

Mr. Schwarz. You were employed at the CIA for what period of time?

Mr. Angleton. From the beginning until December, the

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end of December.

Mr. Schwarz. 1974?

Mr. Angleton. 1974.

Mr. Schwarz. And were you the Chief of Counterintelligence at the CIA for that period?

Mr. Angleton. I was.

Mr. Schwarz. For that entire period of time?

Mr. Angleton. No, from 1954.

Mr. Schwarz. Were you also responsible for relations with Israeli intelligence agencies?

Mr. Angleton. That is correct.

Mr. Schwarz. Can you briefly state the connection, if any, between your counter intelligence work and the Israeli work, or put even more generally, how did you happen to have both those jobs?

Mr. Angleton. Well, if I could ask you some clarification, are we addressing ourselves here in terms of this meeting to the Szulc business, or are we trying to take up everything?

Mr. Schwarz. No, we are not going to try to take up everything. We may try to take up a few things beyond the Szulc business. What we are trying to do --

Mr. Angleton. I can direct my answers to you better if I know more where we are going.

Mr. Schwarz. We are going to the Szulc business, but it

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it would be helpful to have a few background first.

Senator Baker. If I may say so, so that Mr. Angleton will not be taken by surprise, there are one or two things that I would like to discuss. The nature of that material would be similar to what you have already discussed with Rockefeller, having to do with the Oswald situation and other things.

Mr. Angleton. Well, to begin with, I went into OSS in 1943, in 1943 from the infantry. And then Iwas assigned to an embryonic counter intelligence unit under General Donovan. My immediate chief was James R. Murphy, who had been a protegee and obtained his law degree in General Donovan's office. And he is a practicing attorney here in Washington. And he was Chief of X-2, which was the counter intelligence. And during that time a number of us were put together who had never had any experience in the subject. And that included people such as Jonnie Oaks, who was the head of the editorial page of the New York Times, and Ben Wells, and a tremendous cross-section of American life.

And there was a training intensive in this country, and I was sent to London. And the purpose of that was to absorb the British experience, and more important, the breaking of German codes.

The breaking of the German codes, which is relevant to our activity, was really done in England. And by way of digression, the Germans were using a receiver machine called

Enigma, the blue prints of which were originally obtained by a Frenchman. And I might add that the Frenchman never received credit for it. And yet that perhaps was the most single important breakthrough of the entire war. And he had obtained it about eitht to nine or ten years prior to the outbreak of war, when it was non-operative. And he had the prescience to know that the systems could only be one thing, that it would be operative in a time of war.

I give this digression simply to point out that the fruits of that breakthrough would first go to the military and the military operations. And the counter intelligence use of it would be the bottom of the list of priorities, in one sense.

But it would mean that a compromise of the material in any fashion to the Germans would destroy the military uses. And during the war or when the Germans went into the war, they brought it up from 10 percent recovery to about 100 percent.

And I believe it was in the neighborhood of some 22,000 operational messages from the German high command. I know the Battle of Tobruk was fought on six intercepts.

So our job was to make use of the counter intelligence for the purpose of playing back German agents to their high command. And this was an elaborate deception. And when the war ended I would say that 99 percent of all reporting agents

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that the Germans had were under our control. And in fact when many of the German hierarchy tried to escape to the west under aliases, their only point of contact for most documentation and money was to our agent under control. And it was called the Safe Haven program.

So London was in a sense a staging area with full access to British, or the fruits of British activity, going back through their entire history. And it was the advance headquarters for General Donovan, and Mr. Murphy.

I was then sent to Italy in 1943. And I took over the counter intelligence for Italy, the OSS, AFHQ, Allied Forces Headquarters.

Subsequently I became the Chief of OSS Italy. And I want to say that my work then became more broad in terms of espionage and all the other branches of OSS. And I re-established the counter intelligence services. And I brought the French back into existence, particularly the man who originally acquired the code, and who worked on it for many years. And by this time it was shifted to the Saudi bloc.

I left Italy in 1947 or 1948 and came back, and was discharged and went into the Agency immediately. And during the period I was in the Agency, of course, I had both agent operations, long distance operations, and counter intelligence, and some sabotage, black propaganda, infiltration.

And probably the first overnight operation that there was,

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which was known as Plan Hope, which is simply putting the Italians in an airplane and having them fly over to the Roumanian border and make very primitive photographs of the whole region.

And I was sent back to the Air Force. And then I had code operations, embassy penetrations, and so on.

So, in a sense the resuscitation of the Italian service, Army and Navy, Air Force, and the Minister of the Interior, was American rehabilitation. And I am not going to go into the details of the political situation. There was the civil war in Greece, and the revival of the international Brigade and in fact the Soviets had built up, when they were not fighting the war, in the post-war period, assassinations, and instability.

And throughout this we had very close supervision from Mr. Murphy, and General Donovan. And we had special interest in the Vatican, and what was happening in Berlin behind the Curtain.

And the then acting Secretary of State for the Vatican, Montini, who is the present Pope. And so there was much to do through our channels, and General Donovan, with Montini, the Pope, who is now the Pope, one of the basic problems was the cold war. We did not buy the cold war, it came to us and we worked with the Germans, and as we broke down the opposition, we began to find that we were not getting the

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Germans, we were getting the Soviets.

But the penetrations and the operations which we ran during the military phase began to take on a character of their own in the civilian phase in the very long term Soviet objectives against the U.S. in particular, and against the allies.

And then I got into all fields of labor, subversion, illegal immigrants, and then revolution. I was in Greece. And our penetrations at that period were fairly high level and sophisticated, because of the reaction to Stalin.

And as the Soviet troops occupied new territories, it was faced with these ambiguities, the defectors coming over to us at very high levels.

And in the course of this, of course, was the Israeli immigration. Technically we were still a part of AFHQ, which was a combined and Allied Headquarters. And the British desires were that our activities be directed in supporting their responsibilities in the Middle East, and, therefore, to prevent the immigration.

And I think the only policy cable that was ever received during that period was one we sent to Mr. Murphy, and through General Donovan to the President. That was where we exercised our influences on the Italians to prevent immigration. And they addressed themselves to this issue, and they came back with an ambiguity, but it leaned

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toward the general proposition that we should not discourage the British nor hurt the British directly, but we should not interfere with the Italians to support the British position.

And so my dealings were with Admiral Maugeria, who had been Chief of the Italian Naval Intelligence, but was then the Commanding Admiral of the Turanian Fleet generally south, where all these illegal immigrants collected and were sent down.

And then they blew up the Irgum, and blew up the British embassy in Rome, who were my opposite numbers. And the man with whom we had set up as the Italian intelligence through the rest of the Israelis -- we had the members of the group, and then we had the dilemma again as to whether we turned them over to the British authorities, and so on.

And we were in a position to make decisions one way or the other. And eventually we came down on the side of releasing them.

And there is so much more of it. I am trying to keep the thread of it.

Mr. schwarz. So you developed some kind of a relationship, perhaps a friendly relationship, with persons connected with the new State of Israel or the hoped-for state of Israeli back in the 1940's?

Mr. Angleton. That is right.

Mr. Schwarz. And was there any other significant reason why you kept the Israeli account, if that is the right expression?

Mr. Angleton. There wasn't one after I left there, nor was there one here in Washington.

But the other side of the Israeli problem was that you had thousands coming from the Soviet Union. And you had the Soviets making use of the immigration for the purpose of sending illegal agents into the West, and breaking down all the travel control, identifications and so on.

And so there was both a security problem and a political problem. And one of my men married, I might say, the head of the Zionist movement in Italy, the underground. So I had a connection to this man. He was very important.

So, coming back to Washington, I was Special Assistant to Colonal Donald H. Galloway, who was head of the clandestine side and covered the world, on all sides of clandestine activity.

And subsequently I was Chief of Operations for Espionage.

And in 1954 I had a special operational unit, and was made head of the counter intelligence.

Mr. Schwarz. In the period beginning in 1954 and lasting until 1974, when you left the Agency, did you have any relationship -- is the Israeli account the wrong way to say it?

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Mr. Angleton. It is all right. It is as good as ny other.

Mr. Schwarz. Did you have any relationship with the Israeli account?

Mr. Angleton. No. That began in 1951. There was no relationship between the Agency and the Israeli intelligence.

Mr. Schwarz. You mean at all, or prior to 1951.

Mr. Angleton. There wasn't any from 1947 -- 1946 on.

Mr. Schwarz. Then it began in 1951. And all I am trying to establish, and not spend a lot of time with it, is, do you have any relationship with Israel, Israeli intelligence, or the Israeli account on behalf of the Agency between 1951 and 1974.

Mr. Angleton. It was resonstituted in 1951. And I was the negotiator of the arrangement. The Mayor of Jerusalem, Pete Kollek, was at the other end of the negotiation. He was stationed in Washington. But during the Jewish Agency period he was head of the intelligence in Turkey, during the war and prior.

Mr. Miller. How was that agreement negotiated?

Mr. Angleton. It was negotiated by finding waat dis we have in common. It was reviewed by Admiral Hillenkoetter, who was then Director. And he was to be succeeded by General Walter Bedell Smith. And the decision was made during the war that Bedell Smith was to take over, and Allen Dulles return

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to this activity, that we would go ahead and re-establish a relationship. And after a lot of bureaucratic problems, they gave me the account.

Mr. Miller. What ws the nature of the arrangement that was agreed upon between the two services?

Mr. Angleton. In most simplistic terms, they were informed that we would not work with them against the Arabs, that we would work with them on Soviet intelligence and Soviet bloc intelligence and communism, where it existed.

Mr. Schwarz. Did that agreement -- which I take it was more flexible that -- but did it remain in effect throughout the period of your service with the Agency?

Mr. Angleton. More or less.

Mr. Miller. Was this agreement in the form of a paper?

Mr. Angleton. Paper and operations, discussion.

Mr. Miller. And under whose authority was the agreement made?

Mr. Angleton. Under the authority of the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Prime Minister of Israel on the other side.

Mr. Miller. And this involved the exchange of resources of both countries?

Mr. Angleton. The term "resources" is not quite correct. Everything except their own people. It was giving

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up papers and signals, communications intelligence, and all the other products of intelligence action.

Mr. Miller. So the Director of Central Intelligence was aware of the agreement. Was the President?

Mr. Angleton. The President was aware of it. And the Secretary of State was the brother of the Deputy Chief of the CIA, and eventually was very much involved.

Mr. Miller. Where is a record of this agreement kept, as an instrument of the U.S.?

Mr. Angleton. The internal papers would be in the Agency. The letters, copies of the letters from Ben Gurion to the President or to the Secretary of State I assume are still in the Agency. I dealt with other departments in connection with Africa, and so on, underdeveloped areas.

If you are speaking as to whether there was a representative treaty which was cleared -- and people wanted these things cleared -- I don't think there were any clearances obtained from the Hill.

Mr. Miller. Was it regarded as an obligation or a commitment from the U.S. to Israel on certain matters?

Mr. Angleton. When you use the word U.S. while you may use it as contracting officers and all that, there was very little reduced to writing. And it is a custom of intelligence that intelligence supersedes writing. And there have been very few directors to my knowledge that would

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put their pen to hand to sign an agreement to some understanding. It is based on a fiduciary relationship and common understanding.

So, these were all understandings that were generated by events. WE had the arrest of the nine doctors, and the pogrom in Russia. And obviously you didn't go through a lot of bureaucracy, it was there for everyone to see. And it had a direct impact on the question of immigration of agents, and everything else that goes along with it. And I think that characterizes any good operation.

Mr. Miller. How was it possible for succeeding directors of the intelligence agency to understand what the agreements were between, in this case the Israeli intelligence service and the U.S. Intelligence Service?

Mr. Angleton. Very simple. They saw the production to begin with. And they met with directors or the head of Israeli intelligence. And they met with Ambassadors and prime ministers. And they were very much involved.

Mr. Schwarz. Just one more background question and then we will turn to the principle subject.

Following through on the subject of Israel up to your departure in 1974, is there any connection between your departure and handling of Israel? And if there is, what is the connection?

Mr. Angleton. Well, I think I have said it all to the

commission -- I don't know how wisely. You can always get different information from different people. But Colby told them, so I would like to give him the benefit of the doubt on it. But over a period of time Colby -- who is not my cup of tea professionally or in any other way, and in my view is on the negative side of life -- and Dr. Schlesinger, before he went to Defense, said that Colby was the only other person on Watergate. So you have got certain persons who were prominent. And there was the negative aspect of self-inspection, and inferiors reporting on superiors, until they came through the snake pit.

And in the course of all of this there was time when he assumed the authority, and in total contrast to Schlesinger, he began to regard the Israeli account as something where we had to open the windows and let the air in. And he used phrases such as, we must help out Henry and a few other things.

Any position was that it was a political relationship, and that we were not bound, or should not be bound, to using the Agency on tactical ventures when we had relationships which had strategic implications.

But one must rembmer that there are still three million Jews in the Soviet Union. And the relationship is the only place where you do it with high level agencies who work for ideology and do not work for money. So it is unique.

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And my second point was that everything should be run on the grounds of need-to-know, and should not go into the Arab Division until there was peace in the area. There was no identity of interest or fundamental interest between Israelis and an example is 500 Polish intelligence officers who were Jewish who immigrated to Israel. They knew more about Polish intelligence than the Poles. And the Soviets had worked with the Poles in the West, and trained them in Moscow, where you had the cohesion of 27 bloc services working together through their own congress party apparatus into a collective with Moscow.

And most important, our job was to preserve the integrity of the immigration from the bloc, because the problem of escape to Israel is a religious problem, it is not a political problem. There could not be a prime minister who would survive the day if he did not go along with the idea of the return.

And, therefore, there is a certain kind of parallelism, you might say, between handling the communications intelligence during the war and where a low priority makes use of it and endangers the whole with the question of immigration, where the fruits of that immigration come to this government.

(Recess.)

Senator Tower. Will you go ahead and resume the questioning?

Mr. Schwarz. You were in the middle of an answer, I believe.

Mr. Angleton. What I am trying to say is that immigration is a source of very high level information, and it is very comparable with its problems as communications intelligence during the war when the lives of men were involved in troop movements.

And, therefore, the idea of opening up the doors and things, and so on, to me seemed absolutely contrary to the spirit, and what had been going on for 22 years.

And during that time we had obtained, for example, by way of production, Khrushchev's secret speech which practically created revolutions in Hungary and Poland.

I was just simply reiterating the problem of the immigration. This idea of opening the doors and letting the light in, and breaking down compartmentation, and breaking down the need to know, would inevitably put in jeopardy the immigration, if the Soviets should learn the extent of the activities.

Now, the production ran from everything, such as the secret speech of Khrushchev's against Stalin, it ran into the first hard information on nuclear explosives, and it ran into practically the whole gamut. And I think in a certain period of time it resulted in over 22,000 reports dealing with the Soviet bloc which were unique. And much of this

came from, say, an engineer that had a factory, or what not, in other words, it had a very direct bearing on our own R&D and our own defense budget.

Now, our own way of handling it was to give false attribution, reports, so that if the report was ever compromised, it would not compromise the operations, or the immigration. And, therefore, that was one of the issues.

On the other issue was that to politicize the Agency, as I stated, on the tactical problems, which are going to be with us for a long time.

And to break down the fiduciary relationship-- which is after all a personal business -- all the men I have had were men who stayed in it and came back to headquarters and went back to Tel Aviv, they went to the National Security Council, and went back to Tal Aviv, et cetera, a small group of men. It was probably the most economical operation that has ever been devised in the U.S. Government. I don't think there was more than 10 people that were hired in the same process.

I started from the south side with two Jewish men who worked with me during the war. He sent them over as ordinary people under cover to establish the working hours of things, and I brought over six others and put them through some months of training, outside of the structure.

And one of them rose to be Deputy Chief of the Service. But it is a part of the whole fiduciary business.

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For example, we had certain political overtones where we were used in an affirmative way under President Eisenhower. He wanted to make a real attempt to see if there could ever be a peace in the Middle East. And with Alan Dulles, his brothers, and myself, and Kermit Roosevelt, we put up a plan to bringing in Robert B. Anderson, who had been Assistant Secretary of the Defense.

And he was accredited as special emissary from the President. And I handled his base to Israel, which was secret, black, as we call them, to see Ben Gurion -- and Shaffetz was the Foreign Minister -- and Kollek, who was in the Prime Minister's office, and later Mayor.

And we took him back to Rome. And Kermit Roosevelt would take him over to see Nasser. And this went on back and forth on many trips, until the conclusions were reached that there could not be any peace.

But those types of initiatives could be done without publicizing or without destroying it.

Mr. Schwarz. In any event, some dispute in connection with these Israeli matters underlay your dispute with Mr. Colby, which underlay your leaving the Agency?

Mr. Angleton. Yes. He offered me jobs or what not. But these are matters of principle, as far as I am concerned.

Mr. Miller. Mr. Angleton, you described the fiduciary relationship. Were there points along the way where the U.S.

interests and the interests of Israel were in conflict?

Mr. Angleton. We never got into that. Of course, you only had to read the paper every day to see that.

Mr. MIller. But how did they come up ? You say they didn't come up at all?

Mr. Angleton. Of course, they came up. There wasn't anything secret about it.

Mr. Miller. But what examples can you give?

Mr Angleton. The recent visit of Rabun is a classic case. The so-called reassessment of the Middle East. The Times has better accounts of it than the Agency has.

Mr. Miller. I mean at your level.

Mr. Angleton. I don't quite get the thrust of your question.

Mr. Miller. What I am saying is that you had an unusually close relationship --

Mr. Angleton. It was not unusual. I have had it with many chiefs of services in 80 different countries, so it is not any more unusual than a lot of others. The Frenchman who got the code is closer to me than the Israelis are.

Mr. Miller. Similar to the relationship --

Mr. Angleton. I don't like the word unusual, because to me it is usual.

Mr. Miller. Delete that. If your working relationship

with the Israelis, where you had conflict of U.S. interests --

Mr. Angleton. Give me an example of what you regard as a conflict.

Mr. Miller. Can you thing of any?

Mr. Angleton. You are the one who is posing it. I think a lot of these things are illusions. But what would you regard as a conflict? I don't think there is a conflict regarding the Soviet Union or the balance of power. I don't think there is any question in my view --

Senator Mathias. May I suggest Suez as a conflict that might have posed --

Mr. Angleton. Which Suez are we talking about?

Senator Mathias. The Israeli-British-French attack on Suez.

Mr. Angleton. The U.S. Government position was that we had no commitments with Israel and we had no binding treaties. We had two allies that had just fought a war with us, and both of whom betrayed us. And Eden's head went with it. And that is very clear and well documented. The Israelis were not blamed because we didn't have any agreements with them, they had violated no agreements. The British had agreements. The British tried to give us a deception plan, should they have naval vessels in the Mediterranean, and they were there for a different purpose.

Mr. Kirbow. Let me see if I can make a point on just a common sense level.

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Senator Mathias. Let me follow this Suez question a little more closely.

That is a point at which the U.S. policy differed from the policy which was adopted by British and France and Israel?

Mr. Angleton. Correct.

Senator Mathias. And would a situation of that sort confront you with difficulties in your operations because --

Mr. Angleton.There have always been crises with them.

Senator Mathias. And how do you resolve a crisis of that kind?

Mr. Angleton. You don't see the fellow for a few days.

Mr. Miller. I see.

So your method was to deal with them on those matters --

Mr. Angleton. A total neutrality of interest.

Mr. Schwarz. Could we turn to the subject of atomic technology?

Mr. Kirbow. Excuse me. I think for the record we should make it clear, I think Mr. Angleton has had an interview with the staff, and he has been made aware that a witness testified here under oath as to certain matters, and that that is the approach that we are going to take now.

Is that clear?

Mr. Schwarz. I want to ask the question generally first and then come to the other testimony.

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Mr. Angleton, has the Central Intelligence Agency directly or indirectly transferred any atomic technology or know-how to Israel?

Mr. Angleton. From my knowledge, the answer is an absolute no. That would be one of those grounds that Mr. Miller was referring to, where the Agency, in the person of Mr. John McCone, had some of the sharpest words probably in the history of the relationship.

Mr. Schwarz. You mentioned those at lunch, and you might just put that on the record.

Mr. Angleton. I want to state that to my knowledge the Israelis themselves never raised the question of their atomic capability or their atomic interests, with one or two small exceptions, which was where there had been somebody who had been PGed from the U.S., were he ever to get his visa to come back and attend some meeting, something on that level.

Mr. Schwarz. I want to make sure that I have asked the question broadly enough.

Did the Agency take any steps to make available to the Israelis any personnel who had knowledge about atomic matters.

Mr. Angleton. None whatsoever.

Mr. Schwarz. And specifically with respect to a man -- let's go off the record for a minute.

(Off the record.)

Mr. Schwarz. Back on the record.

Do you know a scientist called Dr. Wilfred Mann?

Mr. Angleton. I do.

Mr. Schwarz. Does he have any knowledge of atomic matters?

Mr. Angleton. Yes. He was one of the originators.

Mr. Schwarz. To your knowledge was he ever put in contact with any Israeli person directly or indirectly?

Mr. Angleton. Not to my knowledge, never.

Mr. Schwarz. Do you know a journalist called Tad Sculc?

Mr. Angleton. I do.

Mr. Schwarz. Did you meet with him sometime this year?

Mr. Angleton. In March.

Mr. Schwarz. Where did you meet him?

Mr. Angleton. At the house of Ben Wells.

Mr. Schwarz. And did the three of you then go for dinner some place?

Mr. Angleton. That is correct.

Mr. Schwarz. At that meeting did you discuss --

Mr. Angleton. We went as Sculz's guests somewhere to dinner.

Mr. Schwarz. At that meeting did he raise with you the subject of the transfer of atomic technology from the CIA to Israel?

Mr. Angleton. Yes.

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Mr. Schwarz. What did he say to you?

Mr. Angleton. They prefaced his remarks by stating that he was not a professional scientist, but he was a Jew, and so was his good friend Hersh. And they had some strange ESP working in which one said to the other, have you heard what I have heard, and the other one said, I think I may have heard what you have heard. And then this thing went back and forth, and then it finally devolved, one said, did it have anything to do with Angleton, and the other one said yes, and it went on to where they discovered that each had had separate sources that I had been instrumental in acquiring plutonium for the Israelis, and as a follow-up, to help the Israelis on their know-how by sending Dr. Mann to Israel clandestinely. And they both had their stories, and they had a gentleman's agreement.

And the matter was published without notifying the other.

Mr. Schwarz. And what did you say in response?

Mr. Angleton. My response to him was, it was wrong. But he had not identified the scientist. So, I asked him --

Mr. Scharz. When you say it was wrong --

Mr. Angleton. His statement was wrong.

Mr. Schwarz. So you denied the story that atomic technology had been transferred to Israel?

Mr. Angleton. I said, it is wrong.

Mr. Schwarz. I just want to make sure what it is. It

does constitute a denial.

Mr. Angleton. His story was wrong.

Senator Baker. Let me ask you, Mr. Angleton, do I understand by that that you mean every material aspect of the story was wrong and incorrect?

Mr. Angleton. I didn't mean quite that. I was more interested in the fact that, one, he knew Tad Szulc -- I am sorry, that I knew Hersh -- and that Hersh told him that his source was the man who gave him the December 22 article, and whether he "had been set up" --

Senator Baker. What December 22?

Mr. Angleton. That is the time they kicked off the entire furor on the past espionage thing.

Senator Baker. Against American citizens?

Mr. Angleton. Yes.

Senator Baker. Did they do that once?

Mr. Angleton. No, because neither disclosed their independent sources to the other.

Senator Baker. The point I am trying to clarify for my own purposes is that the conversation you just related you said was wrong.

Do I understand you to mean that every material aspect of that statement was wrong?

Mr. Angleton. Yes. But I didn't know my motives on a lot of questions that I had with him. Because this was the

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first live human being I saw that had actually allegedly heard from Hersh. And he thought they had been set up -- and that was the biggest agony in the Agency.

Senator Baker. And the person who set him up --

Mr. Angleton. Hersh told him, according to Szulc, that he was scared of the story, because this was his source on the December 22 article. And therefore he wondered aloud whether he had been set up.

Senator Baker. Did he say who had been the source of the December 22 information?

Mr. Angleton. Absolutely no.

Mr. Kirbow. Off the record.

(Off the record.)

Mr. Schwarz. I just want to make sure, in your conversation with Mr. Szulc as opposed to your testimony here today on the merits, did you deny to Mr. Szulc that you or the Agency had facilitated the transfer of atomic technology to Israel?

Mr. Angleton. I denied it. But the conversation drifted rapidly, because Szulc was talking about a very great agent that he had in the Agency. And he was bragging about the fact that he had more sources than Hersh had. And then he said, do you know Australia?

And I said, yes, I know Australia.

Does the word Sydney mean anything to me?

Yes, he word Sydney does mean something to me.

Do you know sho is bicycling in India?

And Isaid, I am afraid I am not with you.

And he said, Sidney X. And Sidney X is one of our most sensitive employees who retired, and is bicycling in India.

And I give this as an illustration of the cat and mouse business of this whole evening.

And he said he got that from his source.

Now, that man's name is Sidney Gottlieb. And he was the head of our technical services department, which means that there is a cross plant in our business. And the man who was bugging and performing all the hundreds of technical services, has access, unfortunately, to many of our operations.

There is one juncture point in the business where there is a breakdown of compartmentation. And for him to indicate that he knew Gottlieb, and the sources that had been raised in my mind, since I was talking about a scientist, plutonium, atomic energy, and all these matters, that his source might be in our Technical Services Division, which, if he was, he would know everything, or could get into everything.

But I didn't tell him that.

In fact, I expressed little or no interest in his source other than asking him a few questions, is he Jewish, and this or that and so on.

Senator Baker. Could I ask you a question at this point?

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Mr. Angleton. Surely.

Senator Baker. What you are relating to me seems to imply that Szulc's information was very, very good on sensitive information?

Mr. Angleton. No. That information, sir, would have been unclassified.

Senator Baker. I am speaking more of the Sidney X Gottlieb relationship.

Mr. Angleton. But he only said that he was bicycling in India. But the way he went about it, do you know Australia, do you know Sidney, do you think this, and so on -- it was that sort of thing.

Senator Baker. Do you think he had a source in India?

Mr. Angleton. It started to worry me, because he was talking plutonium, which was scientific. Gottlieb, before he went to that whole department of his, was transferred to Carl Duckett. And that is the reason Gottlieb left.

Senator Baker. You mean he didn't want to work for Duckett?

Mr. Angleton. That is part of it.

And there are also questions of principle. You take it from one director -- it is lifeblood -- and get it to another director.

Senator Baker. Is this the same Gottlieb who was in charge of processing the photographs that were taken in Dr.

Fielding's office?

Mr. Angleton. His office would have been.

Senator Baker. Do you know of that situation?

Mr.Angleton. No, except --

Senator Baker. Het me ask you this and I will turn it back to counsel.

Was there any conversation in which Szulc or Hersh talked to Colby about thesematters? Did you ever get any impression that they were implying that Colby was their source?

Mr. Angleton. The only thing that came up is that when I saw Colby yesterday -- which is the first time since December -- he told me that he had bought a theory of mine on Szulc, but he did not look with any misgivings on Hersh. He said that one year before he had seen Hersh about the submarine article, and that had Hersh been a Soviet agent, the Soviets would not have permitted the operation to take place.

And I told him that he was erroneous, that to use that guide was simply not to understand what the game is all about.

And when Philby was stationed in Washington he helped the FBI in working on some communications intelligence which led to the identification of Klaus Fuchs. But in spite of Philby being a Soviet agent, the Soviets were prepared to let Klaus Fuchs go down the drain rather than hurt Philby.

Senator Baker. As an ultimate cover?

Mr. Angleton. Precisely.

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He was a more valuable agent. If he had not been uncovered he would have been today Chief of British Intelligence.

In the case of George Blake, who was in the British secret service, he gave to the Soviets one year in advance the entire plans of our so-called Tunnel of Love, that is, the tunnel we built in Berlin -- very elaborate -- to tap all of the Soviet military lines.

Now, even one year in advance, they took no preventive action in order to save George Blake.

Now, what has happened since December 22 to the U.S. intelligence community, in the position that Hersh enjoys, with the prestige and the impact on the U.S. public, it stands to reason that you can't get them to give any baby talk as to what the Soviets would or would not do, when you see something that is the objective from the end of the last war to the present, and destroy the agent.

Senator Baker. Do you think Hersh is a Soviet Agent?

Mr. Angleton. I am not saying that he is a Soviet agent. To begin with, when I went back to see Wells, who was in counter intelligence with me in London during the war, I told him I could not buy Szulc's article regarding Hersh, the alleged meetings and that they had certain sources, and the introduction of Dr. Mann's name and so on simply didn't hold water, and something was wrong.

But Dr. Mann is a suspect Soviet agent, a friend of

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Burgess, and a friend of Philby. And the home background which is a factual thing, is only known to very few services. And for him to introduce it into this scenario gave it a taint that lifted it out of just simply gossip.

How would he ever know the name Mann?

Senator Baker. That is what I was driving at, is it fair to infer from that conversation that there was an indication that Szulc had a very good source within the Agency?

Mr Angleton. Either that, or the way I look at it, I am prepared to admit, because of an article he wrote, in the cryptonym Easy Chair in the Oval Office of the White House.

Senator Baker. Talking about the bugging situation?

Mr. Angleton. That crytonym Easy Chair was the most s sanctified word in the Agency. And what it dealt with was -- it was called Easy Chair for the simple reason that if the Soviets were blocked, people abroad were moving into this house or this office.

Senator Baker. Off the record.

(Off the record.)

Mr. Angleton. But let me put it this way.

He said, I called Ben Wells to see you, because I wanted a safe place in which to raise all this stuff.

Mr. Schwarz. This is Szulc?

Mr. Angleton. This is Szulc.

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And in fact, I think they had been talking sometime before I arrived.

And with Wells' background, the New York Times abroad, nd Szulc's time abroad, apparently --

Senator Tower. Excuse me. Will you go back just a bit here? You raised a question of how did Szulc know the name of Mann and know about his association with Philby and Burgess.

Mr. Angleton. Yes.

Senator Tower. You raised the question but did not answer it.

How do you think he could have known it?

Mr. Angleton. This is what bothers me, that he is either unwitting, or has a source who has knowledge and is working for an opposition, or he has a source who is mischievously exploiting him by, who may be retired, and does know some facts, and therefore it is 10 percent true and 90 percent false.

I would assume his financial situation is such that he is very hungry. I mean that is my general observation, and that he is having a rough time of saving a very lucrative contract with Penthouse for supplying X number of articles. I mean, that is my general feeling.

Senator Tower. Let's go back a moment. You say that he could have come by knowledge of the Mann-Burgess-Philby relationship through an external source?

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Mr Angleton. Yes, either witting or unwitting.

Senator Tower. The KBG knows this, and, therefore, it could have come directly or indirectly from that source?

Mr. Angleton. That is right.

Senator Tower. That is a possibility?

Mr. Angleton. That is a possibility. And he has some brains about the fact that he does have contacts -- he knows the Roumanian Ambassador better than anybody in Washington, and he knows the Poles, and he knows this. And it goes on and on.

So, he is dealing with bloc people who will be reporting back to their headquarters very detailed -- assuming he is totally innocent, and given his position in Washington, Szulc would be a normal, witting or unwitting, channel for them in disinformation and for any other motive.

So, as to whether he is himself knowing what he is doing, whether he is a dupe, is an outstanding question. But for a man who goes and socializes with the black --

Mr. Schwarz. Did Mr. Szulc ever work for the Central Intelligence Agency?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know. He may have for some of our people in the field.

Mr. Schwarz. Did he ever provide services?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know.

Mr. Schwarz. Have you heard that?

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Mr. Angleton. I have heard that, but I haven'tlooked at the dossier for the last ten years. He came to our attention basically in connection with the leaks in the Bay of Pigs.

Senator Tower. Will you go back to the Szulc-Wells-Angleton meeting?

Mr. Angleton. This basically -- the thing that began to really disturb me was, number one, his comment, as I said before, tha Hersh told him that the thing that really bothered him about this story was that it came fromthe same source who gave him the 22nd of December, without identifying him, and the fact that when he was going through this business that he had the best sources in the Agency, and that was Sidney Gottlieb, and here was a scientific allegation, plutonium and the scientist and all the rest of them.

And again, if he did have a live source in that area, that means he would have a live source across the board.

When he asked me about my successor, I told him that I was not prepared to respond to that, that every new man was entitled to one free shave.

And he says, I know your successor. And I don't think he actually mentioned the name. But in this article which has just come out he mentions him with his biographical sketch.

Senator Baker. Who was your successor?

Mr. Angleton. Goorge Kalaris.

I had never known him before.

So obviously he was talking to me as somebody disaffected from the Agency, et cetera.I mean that is my view of why he was doing all this. Whereas my concerns were quite different than his.

Mr. Schwarz. Do you think it is possible, because of those different concerns, that your effort to deny the story did not get across to Mr. Szulc?

In other words, you are saying you had some concerns that dealt with the scientist being involved, that dealt with the newspaper source, that dealt with Easy Chair, that dealt with the statement that maybe the December 1974 article was inaccurate. And he pursued all these matters with some vigor and interest.

Do you think it is possible that because of that that whatever denial you made of the transfer of atomic parts of thestory didn't get across to Mr. Szulc?

Mr. Angleton. No, I think it got across to him.

Mr. Schwarz. Can you recall your words to him that denied the atomic transfer?

Mr. Angleton. My chief words to him was, I said, do you realize what a thing like this implies, and what it would do, depending on how the media picks it up, in destroying all the efforts in the Middle East?

Mr. Schwarz. But words like that are as consistent with beingtrue as being false?

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Mr. Angleton. They were consistent, but they weren't stated in that fashion. They were stated in the fashion that Dr. Mann is a person who fits within the Philby, et cetera, complex in a false story of this sort, which comes to the British, who pull out a file on Mann, and they read down and go back into the fact of Mann's association with me, Mann's association with Philby, all this stuff of my actions with the Israelis and all that, regardless of what the U.S. Government tells the British or the French, or the Canadians, or the Australians, or the New Zealanders, all of whom have fundamentally the basic information -- it would be a confirmation to them, based on very high level secret information, that the story was true.

Senator Tower. Let me pursue just about three questions here.

Did Szulc specifically ask you whether or not, during the early sixties, fissionable material, along with nuclear technology and technological assistance, was passed to the Israelis?

Did he ask youto confirm or deny that?

Mr. Angleton. I can't remember it with precisely that type of precision. The story that he gave was a very lucid, straightforward story without any if's, and's and but's.

Senator Twoer. Did you deny only in part the validity of the question that he asked?

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In other words, if he askedyou about the passage of both fissionable material and technology, did you deny wholly or in part that there had been a passage of fissionable material?

Mr. Angleton. No, I denied his story -- I would like to keep that as his story, something he came and presented. And then when he got down into the other things, which had to do with technology, all I can say is that anyone who follows closely the Nasser, and then later on Sadat accusations against CIA, it is voluminous in terms of their spelling out the sophisticated gadgetry which they discovered, which came from Central Intelligence.

This is a thing that has always concerned us, because in the last war we lost -- and we still do this today, we don't know the extent of this -- we lost some of the installations which we had put in there.

Mr. Schwarz. When you say "we", you mean the CIA?

Mr. Angleton. The CIA -- the Israeli lost entirely --

Mr. Schwarz. When he say we put in there, you mean the CIA put in there?

Senator Baker. What installations?

Mr. Angleton.The line of sight, electronics --

Senator Baker. YOu are not talking about --

Mr. Angleton. I am talking about the signal intelligence. And there was some very sophisticated gear that was put in

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there. And I want to complete this -- because of the fact that most of the information which we gained from the SAM's, which had a direct bearing on using B-52's in Vietnam, we gained through Israel. We could read a whole lot of the computerizing and so on of those SAM's. And therefore we were prepared to give highly sophisticated equipment to Israel to work against that Russian business in order to transfer the knowledge to Vietnam.

So I told them, I said, yes, we have worked on questions -- we have always helped them out technologically. And I think I made the comment that any piece of gear we ever gave them, that they turned it to a far greater sophisticated use than we had, which was true in many instances.

And they would cannibalize, and we would get the product.

But there was no -- so that this is clearcut, there was no attempt to lead him on regarding the nuclear one, because the nuclear one was very clearly stated to him, that the injection of Mann into the story had a certain significance of its own.

And I think Wells will bear me out very clearly on this, that the injection of that could not be magic, it had to come from somebody who is in the intelligence service. I mean that element -- and if this story without the introduction of Mann had bee n told, it would be just another of the many rumors.

And Senator, there is something I forgot, and I want to

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get back to it. After the Six-Day War the Soviets sent out a barrage of propaganda in Arabic fto the Middle East from Ardio Moscow that the CIA -- and then mentioned Bill Harvey, who was working for us, and whom I had put in touch with the Israelis during the Cuban business -- had met on a ship with Morris, the Chief of the British Intelligence, who had a background in the war with the Israelis, and had met there and prepared and carried out all the strategic part of the Six-Day War. And this is all PFIS. And there was a tremendous pike of Soviet materials -- they never got much into our media, because it is directed to the Middle East in Arabic, and which obviously they knew.

They used Harveys' name instead of my name, because professionally we were very close, and more important, I had introduced Harvey as the only officer to the Israeli operational people on the Cuban business. And, therefore, it showed they had knowledge of Harvey's, and so on.

The query then raised was whether the penetration was here or was it in Israel.

Mr. Kirbow. Did you express any concern to Mr. Szulc about the use of Dr. Mann's name in this article?

Mr. Angleton. Not Dr. Mann's name. My expression was that if you -- I said that article, false as it is, with the many things injected in it -- I will be very frank with you, I became scared of the thought, because, one, the story of

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these two journalists was so implausable, and I looked over to Ben a few times -- and I know him well -- and he had absolutely a stoney expression, no expression on his face. And this was something very, very queer, and the whole thing was initiated by him. And that was why I asked Mr. Szulc, did he come to you or did you come to him.

Senator Baker. Did he come to you?

Mr. Schwarz. He came to us.

Senator Tower. Let me ask you one specific question, yes or no.

Did you confirm to Szulc that during the late fifties subsequent to the Suez War that the CIA made available to the Israeli Government technical assistance and the availability of one or more distinguished nuclear scientists or physicists for the purpose of developing atomic weapons?

Mr. Angleton. That is completely false.

Mr. Aaron. Mr. Angleton, did you confirm or deny that to Mr. Szulc?

Mr. Angleton. I am stating that I never made any such statement. And I stayed off of the nuclear business.

Mr. Aaron. So you didn't confirm and you didn't deny, is that correct?

Mr. Angleton. It is very difficult for me to respond to that, because after all, this was a fast-moving discussion covering an awful lot of subject. And furthermore, in the

back of my mind was the fact that we had problems with the Israelis in the nuclear field.

Mr. Aaron. What problems were those?

Mr. Angleton. They were very sensitive problems. And I don't think that they really shed any light on things that you are talking about here.

Mr. Aaron. Do you recall a conversation with me and Mr. Schwarz in which, in discussing this same matter, you said you felt under no obligation to either confirm or deny this story with Mr. Szulc?

Mr. Angleton. Yes, I know I used that phrase. There was a denial. And I think that Wells would second the fact that there was a denial. But when I got down to a lot of the other questioning, my thinking was to try to lead him around back into the meeting with Hersh, and lead him back to this source that had to do with Sidney Gottlieb, and so on.

Senator Tower. Are you saying in effect, then, that any questions he raised with you about the transfer of visual material or deeper technology, or manpower, for that matter, to the Israeli Government, was couched in circumlocutry terms of some kind?

Mr. Angleton. I will put it this way.

Senator Tower. That you got no direct questions of that sort?

Mr. Angleton. I would say this to you, Senator. When

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I left there -- and I think this is a very important point -- first, I will have to explain we went to the restaurant, he invited us to the restaurant, he was insistent on it. And we went there. And here in the restaurant the entire discussion was a recapitulation by him, in a restaurant that was fairly full of people. Hersh was a person who had requested a secret meeting in Wells'house, and then proceeded in a restaurant to regurgitate this entire matter.

Senator Tower. Which restaurant was it?

Mr. Angleton. It was the Sea Catch.

Senator Baker. Did you ever have any impression that it might be recorded, is that what you are driving at?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know. The thought crossed my mind. I looked at him, and he sort of -- he could hide a lot of things.

And so we got back to Wells' house. And it was very late. And he tried to get me to come back to his place. And I told him I just wouldn't do it. And that is how the thing broke up.

Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Angleton, in your long relationship and position with the Agency, did you ever express your concern to anyone out there that you thought this might have been a setup by a foreign source, or from internally?

Mr. Angleton. What might be a setup?

Mr. Kirbow. That this whole Szulc interview, story and

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everything else.

Mr. Angleton. I never discussed this with anybody in the Agency until we had this lunch.

Senator Baker. Do you suspect that now?

Mr. Angleton. I do not -- I don't know what to suspect, because I don't have access to files. And I think one has to review a lot of material. I think one has to review Szulc's files.

Mr. Miller. You spoke of that earlier, you described it as a dossier.

Mr. Angleton. Well, I think there is a file on it, a security file. I think he was one of the journalists, the first one, who made a reputation for blowing the whole Bay of Pigs, and so on. And I think the fact that he is foreign-born, and the allegations and so on. And so the Bureau has a similar file. And many of these files are created -- and they get to be accredited to the Pentagon, and therefore a routine security check is made.

Mr. Schwarz. Are you aware of any surveillance of Mr. Szulc?

Mr. Angleton. No.

Mr. Schwarz. Past surveillance?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know. I am not aware of it. As I say, I don't think I have ever seen his file for five or ten years.

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Mr. Kirbow. In your official capacity in the CIA you never had any occasion to cross Mr. Szulc's trail or consider him as a person --

Mr. Angleton. I separated him once in a fight with a friend of mine.

Mr. Kirbow. But nothing in an official capacity?

Mr. Angleton. No.

Mr. Miller. Let me ask another question on this file matter.

Yousaid that to your knowledge there were files on Mr. Szulc. Were there files on other newspapermen?

Mr. Angleton. Yes, there are files on other newspapermen.

Mr. Miller. And other Americans?

Mr. Angleton. A lot of them.

Senator Baker. Hersh wrote a story about -- what did he say -- 7,000 files. Was that right or wrong?

Mr. Angleton. I think it would be many more. I have never counted them.

Senator Baker. How many? A hundred thousand, a million?

Mr. Angleton. Well, when you consider all visa checks -- and we do 500,000 visa checks on foreigners -- and the question of American sponsors and so on -- this thing on all of this is a question of the gradual deterioration of our efficiency, because our staff was cut in half, and we had the problems

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of the Watergate, and we had all of these things. And so a great deal of this stuff was there, but it wasn't being professionally worked upon.

Senator Baker. You have mentioned the Watergate twice, Mr. Angleton.

Can you shed any light on that period in the Agency's life, the impact that the Watergate investigation had or any involvement of the Agency in any of the so-called Watergate affairs?

Mr. Angleton. Of the Agency itself?

Senator Baker. Or anybody connected with it.

Mr. Angleton. I am sorry, sir, that is a debatable question there, and I want to get it accurate.

What was that again?

Senator Baker. I don't want to narrow it. I want to make it broad.

Mr. Angleton. I want to make sure I understand you.

Senator Baker. There are two parts of the question. One, do you know of any Agency involvement of those who were working in the -- working with the AGency in the Watergate, in your break-in or the preparation for the cover-up or the attempted cover-up?

Mr. Angelton. My answer on that is, I do not. And by that I am separating the midnight channel 26 things and the newspapers. I know Jim McCord extremely well.

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Senator Baker. Are you aware of the letters that McCord wrote to the DCI after the Watergate suggesting how you could avoid having this blamed on the Agency?

Mr. Angleton. I am aware of what was in the press. And Paul Nabami (Gaynor) recently died who wrote those letters, and it made great sense to me, and I had personal relationships beyond an official relationship.

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Senator Baker. He wrote two to Gaynor and three to Helms.

Mr. Angleton. I didn't know.

Senator Baker. I believe so.

Mr. Angleton. In any event, I can say that Gaynor's connection, because he had great trust in Gaynor -- and he was a very stubborn man and he left the AGency on conviction, I assume, or troubles in the Office of Security.

Senator Baker. In connection with Watergate?

Mr. Angleton. He left much earlier.

Mr. Miller. He being McCord?

Mr. Angleton. Yes.

Mr. Miller. Why did he leave?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know. And I was really surprised that he didn't come by and say goodbye.

Senator Baker. Was he a prominent official at the Agency?

Mr. Angleton. He was not.

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Senator Baker. Did he have a prominent responsibility?

Mr. Angleton. He was a man that had a very difficult case abroad, which meant that it had to be buried, no leakages. And I used him twice, and one was a pretty lengthy use of him. And he followed instructions to the letter. He strayed on the one. And it is not important. It is just something that he did something that wasn't very wise.

Senator Baker. Doyou know why he went into the Watergate Complex?

Mr. Angleton. I can't understand it, because I would say it was ideological with him. There wasn't any difficulty in understanding his views on a given subject.

Senator Baker. The equipment that was used, I am told, was a fairly primitive sort for that sort of operation. Does that agree with your appraisal of him?

Mr. Angleton. That is what I read. And that surprised me also, because as a rule -- let me put it this way, what I am saying is, it was the Soviets who made an allegation that in a certain country very close to us they were using a laser beam on a window of the Minister of Defense, and acquiring everything.

So, instead of using anybody in the clandestine side, I took McCord and the group and sent them to that country for six or seven weeks to work on it. So, McCord has great knowledge of the -- he knows the counter electronics. And

to know that you have got to know the other.

Senator Baker. He was familiar with the most exotic source of intelligence gathering?

Mr. Angleton. Precisely.

And that is why I can't understand -- I mean, if the papers are correct in what they have stated, although many of the sources were people who also sell electronic equipment.

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Senator Baker. I don't want to lead you too far away from the original subject. But I would be interested in knowing what if any information you can give us about the Oswald situation.

For instance, does the Agency keep a file, or does it have a file on Lee Harvey Oswald?

Mr. Angleton. They have a file. They have, I think, more than one. I think they have a subject file, and in that they have all the documentation that went to the Warren Commission through Mr. Raymond Rocca, who is my deputy.

And then there is a lot of undigested material that was brought out after the Warren Commission.

Senator Baker. Was there ever any inquiry? Or do you have any opinion as to whether Oswald was a Soviet Agent?

Mr. Angleton. Yes, I have a very strong opinion. I know the time factor, I will try to shorten this.

But I tried to prevail on Mr. Dulles that there should not be -- that there should be a statement to the effect that the Commission, in the life of the Commission -- that these are

the conclusions on the available evidence. But given the fact that the Soviet Government has a Department 13, which is under the Central Committee, who is taxed with the assassination of Western Leaders, that the door is open, and that is for future generations to speculate. So that it would not be closing the door, that it would really mean the investigation would be pursued.

Senator Baker. John McCone, as I remember, was queried once on whether we could establish the bona fides of certain people, including Oswald.

Mr. Angleton. And Nosenko.

Senator Baker. Was there any advice by you at that time to McCone or other wise that the bona fides of that Soviet person or of Oswald ought not to be stated in categorical terms?

Mr. Angleton. During the period of the Warren Commission we prevented as far as we could any information from Nosenko going under the record, on a question of bona fides.

Senator Baker. Why?

Mr. Angleton. Because we didn't regard him as bona fides.

Senator Baker. What did you regard him as?

Mr. Angleton. We thought he was a dispatch agent who was sent to mutilated the leads of very high grade Soviets whom we had acquired prior to that.

Senator Baker. To mutilate leads relating to the Kennedy

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assassination?

Mr Angleton. Relating to assassination, KGB agents, VASSALL Vassily, the British agents, and many agents in France, a alleged penetration in the U.S., et cetera.

Senator Baker. And did McCone accept your advice?

Mr. Angleton. He did, except that I understood that a lot of it has been declassified. And when he gave this interview recently with Schorr Shor, I called his executive officer Elder and I asked him, and he said, who in the Agency ever alleged to McCone that we now had re-established the bona fides?

And I said, he is an old man and doesn't think too well, et cetera, and don't give me that stuff.

And he said, well, I will give it to you.

And I never heard from him since. But McCone was a man whowould not have made this statement. He has total recall.

Senator Baker. I am sure he does.

Do you have an opinion as to whether or not Oswald was infact a Soviet agent?

Mr. Angleton. Well, let me put it this way.

I don't think that the Oswald case is dead. There are too many leads that were never followed up. There's too much information that has been developed later.

For example, in 1966, in a Soviet book on Cuba there is a photograph of Khrushchev, a photograph of Castro, a photograph of a man called Alexiev, real name Shettov, KGB, with the first

Soviet Ambassador to Havana, and a man named Leontov, who was the Soviet KGB operational man in Mexico. When the Mexican police arrested Castro as a student, they found in his notebooks the name of Leontov, KGB, Mexico.

Now, photographs 61, and so on, are in a KGB journal for Soviet citizens abroad. It is a bible,75 percent KGB staff. Photograph of Brezhnev, Castro, Alexiev, Leontov.

Now, we had a double agent after the assassination, who made a number of allegations that he acquired from the Chief of KGB, Mexico, Yatskov and he was a superior of Leontov. Now, after the assassination Khrushchev was in Cairo on a state visit. And he pulled an American journalist aside, and totally out of context, expressed the view that there was a conspiracy, and it involved the Right Wing of the U.S.

The thingwas totally out of context. And he planted this bug in this fellow's ear.

WE had double agents who stated that the KGB put all of their personnel for six months on working on the assassination, and had concluded that an American Right Wing business under Johnson was to succeed in power. And I am not talking about petty informants. I am talking about men whowere ascertained members of the KGB and part of the Soviet elite.

And I can multiply that. Those cases, those leads have never been followed up. One is because of lack of manpower. Two, the general problem in Washington and the government

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that there is no forum which can adjudicate issues in the intelligence community of a counter-intelligence nature. I may have allegations, very firm, that relate to somebody in high office. But there isn't anyone, ombudsman or somebody, to whom you can go with the information and talk to the Soviets and pull the bureau (FBI) and ourselves and everybody together.

Senator Baker. Could you give us at your leisure a memorandum of your recommendations in that respect, how that might be constituded?

Mr. Angleton. It would not be a pleasant one. I have submitted -- and I don't think it is breaking any confidence -- such a memorandum to the Commission. And I have submitted a personal letter to the Vice Prsident. And my whole plea was that my days were numbered, but regardless, that in and beyond the life of that Commission, that in his position as Vice President he had a rare opportunity the first time these matters were ever aired, and that the disaster of Hoover's death, and Gray, and the Watergate and so forth, has destroyed the counter-intelligence forces.

And this added thing of Hersh has about dealt the final blow.

Senator Baker. I hate to interrupt you, and I also hate to ask you this question, but can you make an evaluation of the effectiveness of the Agency, in particularly its counter-intelligence activities at this time?

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Mr. Angleton. Very, very poor.

I have put in there, and I think it is very conservative, that it has put us back 20 years. But I think in the eyes of every intelligence service in the Western World, where we have had the leadership and we pulled everything together, and where they have looked to us for guidance and for traces and for understanding, that we have lost all of our prestige.

Senator Baker. Two more quick questions, and I will yield my turn.

Do you know of or have any substantial information about Russian KGB activities in the U.S. such as the infiltration of Congressional offices?

Mr. Angleton. There is a whole history of information that relates to the past and to modus operandi and to targets, and so on. And that is inclusive of all the American life, and in particularly visits to the Soviet Union, and so on. Thereare communications intelligence more sensitive which was broken during and after the war, KGB communications, New York to Moscow, and Washington to Moscow, et cetera. And there were cryptnyms given. And it runs into hundreds of thousands of messages, of which a small percentage have been broken.

And they relate to Hiss and many things. And most of those cases will not be subject to prosecution, because they would not be admissible. And there are a lot of problems there. We have worked on it, and we brought the British, the

Canadians, and New Zealanders and Australians, because we have this common denominator of the military and other agreements where they do share common information.

And there are many unresolved cases.

Senator Baker. Do you know of any cases, though, dealing with penetration of a Congressional office?

Mr. Angleton. No. But my statement doesn't mean anything, because I can assure you that it is the last thingI have been concerned with in some months. But I have seen these allegations in the paper, I wouldn't be surprised. And this is the second time in my life, or the third time, I have ever been here. To come here and see how this whole set up is is quite a shock.

Senator Baker. What about communications intercept, Congressional conversations, are you aware of any methodical effort by the Russians or the KGB vis-a-vis Congressional telephone conversations?

Mr. Angleton. Absolutely. I think -- I am assuming now that the people in NSR are correct, they usually are, that the telephone, the formal telephone company traffic apparently, without the knowledge of the caller, is quickly shifted to microwave. That runs into hundreds of thousands of telephone calls.

Now, I used to be quite deeply involved in the penetration of embassies, and so forth, in my youth. And it

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is a fingernail, arm and body affair. It takes an awfully long time before you finally get into a code room and a place where you can do something securely.

What I am trying to say is that if you get enough depth on any target or any installation you begin to know much more about that installation than anybody who occupies it.

Senator Baker. If I were trying to confirm the rumor that the KGB had the capability and did in fact record as many as 30 or 40 thousand simultaneous telephone conversations, mostly related to governmental officials, and transmitted them to the Soviet Union, and kept individual files on them, would you confirm that for me?

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Mr. Angleton. I would state that that is absolutely in my view correct. And I would say that the man who technically could respond to that would be Dr. Lou Tordello, a retired Chief of NSA who is now, I think, still a consultant there. And he is probably amore sophisticated person to relate the products of NSA to the realities of the question you asked.

And I think the other point I would make is simply that what their KGB has, which we never will have, is manpower. In other words, we have to narrow the size of the target some day the way the British did, and expel that 105,

Our State Department says that what happened in England has no relevancy here, because we have had a different setup, because among those expelled men who served in Washington,

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and who weren't in the U.K., were those who were on the Anglo-American Desk, which meant that there was an American whom they had handled in Washington who had been transferred to London where the case officer follows the agent.

And that statement, official statement, was put out without any consultation with the Bureau or ourselves. So, we are living in a dream world here in terms of Soviets, and time is short, it is detente, and it is all the fallation kind of discussions and arguments one hears on the subject. We have come to detente for information through operations and our understanding of it, not wishful thinking.

And our views are shared by professionals all through the Western World. And they laugh at the U.S. in terms of what detente has done. But what it has done to the intelligence services, or to the FBI, the FBI is only a shadow of what it once was. And so there isn't any real internal security protection.

The Bureau's problems -- and I had the case of a KGB officer threatening one of the people we are dealing with in the Mid-west, he was from the United Nations, a young KGB fellow. And I asked the Bureau, was he a ________?

And they said, we put him to bed.

They didn't put him to bed, he was where he wasn't supposed to be. And I tried to get the department to go in with him. And I am still up there.

on two or three points. And I said, I am exercising my rights under the CIA, and so on.

But he said, I have got to run, and it was about five past five. And I asked him if he understood in effect what he was doing, the implications.

And he said, that is the responsibility I would assume.

And I said, what about Mr. Meyer, and building up to be our successors?

And we were about the same age. And he introduced Meyer over the years into more sensitive operations, and all the foreigns with whom we worked, agents and what not. And the reaction to him universally was, he was to be the successor.

And he said, that is something I will have to negotiate.

And I said, what do you mean negotiate?

And he said, we will talk about it next week.

So, I got up and shook hands with him and walked out.

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Senator Baker. Do you know of anyone having electronic surveillance conversational recording in the Oval Office other than the Presidential (?) capability?

Mr. Angleton. Never.

Senator Baker. Do you know of anyone who ever penetrated the Presidential apparatus?

Mr. Angleton. Never, Senator.

What has come out about the Joint Chiefs and all that stuff in the paper?

Senator Baker. I am speaking of anyone who might have penetrated the taping capability in the Oval Office?

Mr. Angleton. No.

Mr. Schwarz. Can I follow up some of the questions that Senator Baker asked you about Oswald?

What about the pictures, one of which was a picture of Leontov that was in a piece of paper found in Mr. Oswald's pocket when he was arrested in Mexico?

Mr. Angleton. There is an allegation.

Mr. Schwarz. What connection is there between that picture and that allegation and Lee Harvey Oswald?

Mr. Angleton. The only thing is, Oswald's trip to Mexico was to go to Cuba allegedly to contact the Soviets.

Mr. Schwarz. And was Leontov then in Mexico, or --

Mr. Angleton. I don't know, because the double agent whom we believe was actually controlled by the Soviets,

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Byetkov, gave us information which we would now regard as private, which would tend to absolve the Soviets of any implication with Oswald.

Mr. Schwarz. When you acquired from a number of sources the information that the KGB had spent some six months --

Mr. Angleton. We only acquired the hard stuff of six months and what they did from one man who was very high in the KGB.

Mr. Schwarz. Without getting into what his name was, when did you acquire the information?

Mr. Angleton. 1967, or thereabouts.

Mr. Schwarz. So it was after the Warren Commission had reached its conclusions?

Mr. Angleton. Did you have any such information during the life of the Warren Commission?

Mr. Angleton. I think the only thing was the Nosenko --

Senator Baker. Which was suppressed by whom?

Mr. Angleton. We suppressed it, because Nosenko arrived at a very brief time after the assassination as a KGB defector.

Senator Baker. And he is the one that you think now as a planted agent?

Mr. Angleton. Yes. They thought he was sent on a mission.

Mr. Schwarz. Suppressed by whom?

Mr. Angleton. Suppressed from the Warren Commission.

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Mr. Schwarz. You said that Nosenko, one of the reasons you suspected Nosenko was a double agent, or a planted agent, rather, was because he was saying things that were contradictory to some other high quality person who theretofore had been giving you information before Nosenko came to this country?

Mr. Angleton. That is right.

Mr. Schwarz. What was the nature of the information relating to the Kennedy assassination that the high quality person had given you?

Mr. Schwarz. Let me say this so that it makes a little more sense.

In December 1961 a member of the KGB in Helsinki defected to us. His name is Golitzen. He has never been in service, except Jack Anderson came out with an erroneous account of it, alleging that he had stated there was a plot to assassinate Nixon. He did not make such a statement.

Mr. Kirbow. Do you think this statement should be on the record?

Mr. Angleton. I don't mind it being on the record after the Anderson article. They have been looking for him.

Now, his is probably without any question the most major defection since World War II as far as Soviet intentions, Soviet organization, and Soviet operations are concerned. And the reason, among others, that it was so important was

he had decided to defect many years prior to December of 1961, if the opportunity ever arrived. And therefore he used those many years breaking down the compartmentalization of the KGB in order to acquire the kind of information which would be most valuable to the US, and to our allies.

Therefore he refused many assignemtns abroad, but tried to always remain in headquarters and get himself appointed to investigative commissions and other things of this sort which would get into everybody elses's business. Among other things, he spent many years in the training schools for people who came back for six weeks from different parts of the world to brag about their achievements. And he absorbed all of this information.

And among other things, he stated that he gave the crytograms and circumstantial evidence of penetrations throughout the West.

And then the Soviets rapidly transferred 300 of their people after his defection. And as is normal in a case of this kind, the big problem is to write a damage report, which means the whole service would come to a standstill. And the objective would be to review all paper files and everything that showed his initials. And you usually would have three categories of information: you would have information which he definitely had knowledge of, and information which he did not have knowledge of, and information which you are not

ceratin about.

Now, when we did a similar operation on the Sergeant Dunlop who was working in the National Security Agency and committed suicide, if I am not mistaken we came to approximately 400,000 documents that he could have had access to, although he may not have had. And it is interesting to note that after his assassination, in a search of the quarters, the Bureay, or whoever did the search, found six of my letters to NSA relating to information from Golitzen.

Senator Baker. Did you speak of the assassination?

Mr. Angleton. What did you say?

Mr. Miller. Did you say Mr. Dunlop?

Mr. Angleton. After his suicide. I am sorry.

Mr. Miller. You used the term assassination.

Mr. Angleton. I meant suicide.

Mr. Miller. The word is interesting, because it is charged, as you know, that he was assassinated.

Mr. Angleton. Maybe I was thinking out loud or something.

In any event, the 1969 Golitzen reports to NSA were in a plastic bag, as I recall, in the attic. And there was a question of whether he passed them before or after.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, what we were on was, I was asking you, you testified earlier --

Mr. Angleton. I just wanted to say Golitzen was so enormous to the Western world because we immediately moved on

those cases which were perishable, the French, the British, and ourselves, et cetera. And we had never had a second Chief Director, which means the FBI type of Soviet, defector in our lives, and all of this out of the blue, and no contact as in Geneva six months after the defection of Golitzen.

Mr. Schwarz. And the date is when in relations to the Kennedy assassination?

Mr. Angleton. Well, this was a contact, this was not a defection. He came to us once for information prior to the assassination.

And then in Moscow the Soviets -- and I am not going into a lot of names, a member of the Second Chief Directorate, gave an American tourist a stack of documents from the Second Chief Directorate, the FBI, relating to how they got (blank), and others of our agents, which showed they didn't get them through a two-headed source, but they got it through a (blank) on our side.

So the leads rant into the thousands from Golitzen, and thousands and thousands of pages of transcript, interrogation, exhibiting photographs, and identifications, which in turn would refresh his memory on other courses. And out of that came the finalization of the case of Philby, Burgess, and all that, the Vassily case in the British Admiralty, and some other cases, and many cases in France and so on.

Mr. Kirbow. Did Oswald show up at that time?

Mr. Angleton. No, not from Golitzen.

But when the assassination took place --

Mr. Schwarz. The Kennedy assassination?

Mr. Angleton. When the Kennedy assassination took place, Golitzen called me immediately and stated that the modus operandi with any defector from anybody's army to the Soviet Union required that he go through processing by the 13th Department of the KGB.

Mr. Schwarz. Which is their assassination department?

Mr. Angleton. Which is their assassination department, which is called their Affairs for Executive Action.

And there are two reasons for it. Number one was, to find out what sophisticated weaponry or training he might have had that would be of use to them. And number two, whether it was more valuable to reinfiltrate him into the National Army for future activity.

Mr. Schwarz. Of the nature of assassinations?

Mr. Angleton. Of anything. It could be sabotage, or intelligence, or whatever.

AND THIS WAS THE SOP on the dealing with military defectors.

Now, when the Soviet Government turned over to the US all the documents that led to the interest regarding Oswald stay in the Soviet Union, there was nothing there indicating processing by Department 13. Then after the assassination

Nosenko, whom we hid once in Geneva, he went back to Moscow. And in my view he would have never come back on the scene because they brought this Cheraponov thing in to have the locus shifted from where we would have controls, in Geneva, to Moscow where they would have all the controls. And that would be the Directorate. And therefore they would have the direct means of counteracting and mutilating the leads and the importance of Golitzen's defection.

But the tourist gave the documents to the American Embassy. And we photographed them. The Charge insisted on giving them back to the Soviets on grounds that it would be appropriate.

Mr. Schwarz. These are not the official documents dealing with Oswald but the documents that the man tried to pass in Switzerland?

Mr. Angleton. The Second Chief Directorate, he took all of the documents out of the FBI Soviet section and gave them to the tourist and we read how we got caught on things.

So there is the assassination. Cheraponov allegedly was chased to the Turkish border and shot. And in my view this is a myth, because in 1948 Cheraponov was stationed in Belgrade, and he tried to defect to us, and at another time tried to establish liaison and contact with the Birtish MI-6, at a time when Philby was Chief of Intelligence, meaning that the approach would have been under Philby in 1948, and

then he reappears in the early 1960's as a member of the Second Chief Directorate.

That is enough of Cherapanov. But it is important only from the Soviet point of view, the best laid plans fall apart.

And then out of the blue, Nosenko, whom we would never have seen again, reappears after the assassination in Geneva, and tells us he wants to defect.

Mr. Schwarz. And he provided information which was inconsistent with Oswald being the Russian agent?

Mr. Angleton. I am coming to that.

So immediately we tried to get the breadth of his career so that we know where the priorities are. And the first thing he tells us is that while he was in the Second Chief Directorate in the American Section, Oswald's KGB dossier went over his desk. And his first story, as I recall it, was that it was two volumes or three volumes. And finally it went down to one volume and a small sheaf of papers.

Also he said that the dossier showed clearly that Oswald was mentally unbalanced, and that he was a poor shot, and therefore couldn't get a hunting license, and a lot of stuff of this sort.

And then on all of these outstanding leads -- penetrations, of the French, the Americans, the British codes, bugging of the Embassy, all of these different sorts -- Nosenko had something to do which diverted us from Nosenko's leads. And

in the normal course of events, we might have put Golitzen in contact with Nosenko, which may have meant the assassination of Golitzen, because the whole approach of Nosenko was one where logically you would bring them in and have two bodies, one from the First Chief Directorate, that is, Golitzen, the CIA part of the system, and the other from the FBI part of the system, and therefore you would have a very strong balance against the KGB. But we didn't do that. Because there were certain things, litmus papers, questions put to Nosenko. And as far as I was concerned, if he was bona fide he would have answered one way, and he did not answer that way. And they had to do with some deeper secrets regarding a meeting of the 2000 members of the KGB and the Soviet Government in May of 1959, presided over by Shelepin and attended by many members of the Central Committee on the reorientation of the Soviet Services and the return to Leninism wherever intelligence operations has a political objective. And this is a part of the process of de-Stalinization. And so when we took him unwittingly chronologically through his career, he omits all of this phase. And we had three or four or five other test things, where their damage report would not show that Golitzen had access, because it was part of his way of getting in and breaking compartmentation. And therefore they would have no evidence that he had sufficient knowledge.

Mr. Schwarz. And so Nosenko looked funny to you, he

looked wrong to you?

Mr. Angleton. Absolutely.

Mr. Schwarz. He looked like a plant to you?

Mr. Angleton. Precisely.

Mr. Schwarz. And among the information that he provided to you was that Oswald was a mental case and was a bad shot?

Mr. Angleton. Right.

Mr. Schwarz. And you had also received from Nosenko --

Mr. Angleton. Golitzen -- from Golitzen -- information that suggested the normal practice was for Department 13, which had responsibility from the Russian KGB for assassinations, to interview military defectors. And we had observed that when the Russians transferred documents concerning Oswald, that there was no reference in there to any such debriefing by Department 13. And another important part of it is that there was a man who was handling George Blake from London, who was Counselor of the Soviet Embassy. And when he returned he became head of the 13 Department, General Rodin. But he was there under an alias as a civilian. He was the Chief of the KGB in London, and a very high grade man. Then he took over the Department 13 and reinvigorated it.

Mr. Schwarz. And what was his connection with Oswald?

Mr. Angleton. I am saying that he was head of Department 13, and was head of Department 13 at a time -- I mean, he had a long history in that, in other words, the prominence of

Department 13 and this is a point I think I should make, that the Agency, unlike the Soviets, does not have an assassination department. The Soviets have always had an assassination department, which is totally sealed off from the rest of the department, which is totally sealed off from the rest of the organization. People from the outside know very little about what goes on in that. People career-wise stay in there. And they report to the Chairman of the KGB, and drop off, who in turn report to the Politboro. And therefore it is an entirely sealed organization which is capable of all forms of action, whether it be sabotage -- an illegal sabotage or what, an illegal directorate which is independent of the rest of the KGB -- nuclear sabotage, and all this type of thing, and infiltration of enemy forces in the event of war. And of course assassination, the assassination of Ukrainian leaders in West Germany.

Mr. Schwarz. Do you recount that simply because it makes more significant the absence of any reference to Oswald because you are giving evidence as to the vigor of Department 13, or did you recount it because there is a more direct connection with Oswald?

Mr. Angleton. This is related to what I told Mr. Dulles, I thought it was absolutely wrong to close the door on the life of the Commission, and instead there should be a statement that we are not in a position -- that on the fact available to us during the given period, these are our conclusions. And

then to spell out in detail Department 13 and its organization -- and the burden of proof shigts. But not only the burden of proof, but you never know when a worm goes into somebody's head to defect from Department 13. And that bring you up on the entire story.

Mr. Schwarz. So you have recounted the importance of Department 13. You have recounted the significance in your mind of the absence of any reference to Department 13 in the documentation on Oswald turned over by the Soviets to the US. And you have recounted the strange nature of the information provided by Nosenko.

Mr. Angleton. Correct.

Mr. Schwarz. Let me ask you another line of questions about each one of these items. As to the Nosenko information, you stated that that information was suppressed from the Warren Commission?

Mr. Angleton. The word suppression is probably not the right word because, I will be very honest with you, I was told the other day that the information was given classified, and it was given to Helms or somebody, or Mr. McCone, who passed it as a classified document. I have asked for it, but I haven't seen it.

Mr. Schwarz. Why did you say a moment ago that it was suppressed?

Mr. Angleton. Because I never knew where it went. When

I was sitting in the position as to where that information would go, I was opposed to it. And my pfficial position was that. And I ghought until relatively recently that it never went.

And then all of a sudden they have declassified a lot of stuff. And Mr. Rocha, who was the point of record of the Agency's dealing with the Warren Commission, told me that Nosenko stuff was the stuff they were declassifying. Now, his role was not one of the executive nature. Actually it was simply because he was a great scholar and a great many other things, and therefore he had the most catholic background to handle something as eomplex as the Warren Commission, not in exercising executive power, but working on behalf of the Director and all the Directorates and everything pertaining to the Warren Commission. He is a tidy individual. And in fact Mr. Belin has made a great deal of use of him in the Commission's business, and he is the one that had done all the digging for the Commission, and so on, on a whole series of matters that I am not familiar with.

But my point to you -- and this is very difficult to explain -- is that the question of Nosenko created a very great division in the life of all counterintelligence as to bona fides, as in all questions of when you are dealing with double identification agents, there is always dispute.

But let me just line up the order of battle here. Our

Chief of the Soviet Division accepted the fact that the man was a provocation. His Chief of Counterintelligence accepted the fact that the man was a provocation.

Mr. Schwarz. Do you mean provocation, or providing false information?

Mr. Angleton. An Agent Provocateur.

I said he was false. My man said he was false. And it isn't a parrot affair, each one reads the same stuff and analyzes and come to their own conclusion. And Golitzen, who defected, based only on the Geneva, first encounter in Geneva, not the defection, had predicted in advance that because of the enormity of his defection they would send a provocateur into the West to destroy and mutilate his leads.

So it was a question of awaiting, you might say, who knocks on the door. And here is Nosenko.

Now, since then the Chief of the Soviet Division who is no longer there, has recanted in a way -- the Inspector General went into all this -- he is today the NIO dealing in Soviet Affairs, the National Intelligence Officer on Soviet Affairs. And his counterintelligence man, a fellow named Pete Bagley, who is the brother of the two Admirals Bagley, and one of the best men we had, left the Agency and is now in Belgium in private life. And I can go all the way through these other people who have been dispersed. But the record will clearly reflect that the preponderance of all individuals

was that Nosenko was sent on a mission.

Mr. Schwarz. And provided false information?

Now, is it your current understanding that what was provided to the Warren Commission was the raw infomration brought by Nosenko, or was the Warren Commission also provided with the opinion of persons such as yourself and others as you have recounted that he was providing false information?

Mr. Angleton. I don't think the Warren Commission was ever faced with the issue of the internal issues of Golitzen or Nosenko.

Mr. Schwarz. You first said that the information was suppressed from the Warren Commission, and then you said no, it is your understanding now --

Mr. Angleton. Well, the word suppression isn't the right word, I said. One went to argue the matter and it was agreed by higher authority that the information shouldn't be --

Senator Mathias. There was a value judgment made as to the usefulness of the material?

Mr. Angleton. That is right -- and not to do what the Soviet in our mind wanted us to do, which eas to give it prominence and have it come out as an official part of the record and documents and articles, and so on.

Mr. Schwarz. But your current understanding is that the information was provided?

Mr. Angleton. That was classified, and never came out in

public.

Mr. Schwarz. But was nevertheless provided to the Commission?

Mr. Angleton. It was made known to them in some fashion.

Mr. Schwarz. Was it made known to them at the same time that at leat certain experts withing the Agency thought it was false information?

Mr. Angleton. I think, as I understand it now, that in spite of our feelings, either Helms or McCone made a presentation of it.

Mr. Schwarz. But without mentioning your feelings, certain experts thought that it was false?

Mr. Angleton. I can't respond to that. I don't know.

Mr. Schwarz. What about the information derived from Golitzen, which indicated in your expert opinion that the documents provided by the Soviet Union were, I think you put it, funny, or strange, or misleading, because they did not include any reference to debriefing by Department 13, was that information provided to the Warren Commission?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know. I don't think so. But all I can say there is this, to be realistic. No one would expect the Soviet Government, regardless, to provide documents, secret documents, on Oswald, whether he was or was not their agent. And I say, I can go all the way back through history, the way they falsified the official record, they had it with

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the Italians in 1923, Constatinople, and cases on diplomatic issues, the complete thing was fabricated, and so on. And there is no way of testing them, the security is such that they can't be tested.

So we are not under any illusions of expecting them to state that he went through the 13 Department, which asked him the following questions.

Mr. Schwarz. So you say that as far as that matter goes there is no possibility that anybody on the Warren Commission was fooled?

Mr. Angleton. I mean, I don't think anybody was. I didn't follow the Warren Commission, Rocha followed it, and he was running over there all the time, and so on.

Mr. Kirbow. Let me ask you. There would have been no reason why anyone on the Warren Commission would have known that as a matter of everyday business that they did in fact run every defector through Department 13?

Mr. Angleton. I don't think we ever told them. But you see, Allen Dulles -- that is what I am coming to -- I used to see Allen Dulles regularly, and I was an advisor officially to him on a lot of headaches, and I dida lot of leg work for him. And I regarded him as a very personal friend. And I am Executor of his papers, among other things.

But the point I am coming to is, to try to give him guidance of what the jungle is around here in terms of the

FBI's position and Mr. Hoover's, and so on, so that he would be more sensitive to the things, no longer being Director, that were no longer germain to his position on the matter.

Mr. Schwarz. Was there a connection between the FBI and Oswald?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know the full FBI story. I know there was a tremendous flap in the Bureau. And one of the best men they had in my view is a professional a man called Burt Turner, who I understand just got his law degree. And Burt Turner was one of the finest men on Soviet KGB activities in the US, one of the analyzts. And he was in the Washington Field Office. And it is my understanding -- and this is basically hearsay, but from pretty good sources -- that Burt Turner was handling the Oswald ore related matters at the time the President made the trip down to Texas, and that there was some confusion that the Bureau had not turned over, or had not taken enough initiative in turning over, all the information on Oswald to the local police. I had been told that there was a black mark put against Turner's name, and that he confronted Mr. Hoover and stated he was not going to permit, or have it be known to his children, that his negligence was responsible for the death of the President. And he was pretty forceful about his position. And as a result, this was expunged or something to that effect. And that is the reason he went to the Washington Field Office instead of staying in

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Headquarters.

And then he retired. And I think his retirement had something to do with this fact.

But this is all by virtue of hindsight with the thousands of cases. And I cannot see any Western intelligence service seizing on facts that Oswald will return to the US, and then going and saying, we will get all of this, and we will send it to Texas.

What I am trying to say, is that the difference in their system. With the manpower and the computers, which are mainly ours, and whatnot, a situation of that sort is automatic. And we know enought about the Second Chief Directorate and the controls, the total controls, to know that if a Soviet returned automatically, to any part of the Soviet Union he went, there would be a dossier that would go, and there would be also an operational directive to put him on tap, check his mail, to do the following, and so on and to put an agent near him. There wouldn't be any leaking anything in the air on that. There would be total encapsulation of that individual until it was ceratin beyond a shadow of a doubt that he was not sent back as an agent.

Mr. Schwarz. A moment ago in talking about the line-up, as I think you put it, of views on Nosenko, you recounted the views of a number of people. And you said that one person had changed his mind or recanted subsequently. And you made a reference in that connection to an Inspector General's

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report. What was that report?

Mr. Angleton. At one stage in all of this -- and it was much later, after all the dust settled -- Helms got the Inspector General, who had come from the clandestine side of our business, to institute -- I don't like to use the word inspection, it is too authoritative -- to go into the Nosenko matter and see if there is anything there that he should know, because Helms is fully aware of the split on this whole question of bona fides, and it bothered him, because I had brought him in touch with Golitzen, and he was fully aware of all my activities, and travels and so on.

And so this person who was chosen began to interview everybody and reopen the whole thing. I mean, there were 21 safe leads of stuff if you really got into all of the Golitzen and Nosenko and the other things that pertained, as I pointed out. to the Warren Commission, to the asininity of what has happened, of 27 years of experience of myself and my two colleagues, that these are the facts, that there are 20 cases --

Mr. Schwarz. You said Warren Commission. You mean Rockefeller?

Mr. Angleton. Excuse me, Rockefeller.

There are 20 some odd cases that a counterintelligence officer in our busienss should know before he even begins to get his feet wet.

Now, when Dr. Schlesinger came in, and I started hearing all of these things of manaement by objectives, and synergistic and a lot of other things, being applied to the art forms which we had developed, I finally got so frustrated that I thought I would take him up on his own thing. So I got statisticians in to take all the safes and figure out the linear footage of every safe drawer, all the way on through, and to computerize how long it would take the normal case officer to come up to this elemental stage of being able to be launched.

That was sort of a preparatory business. And they figured it out and they said it would take 22 man years, we meant that if we were 100 percent incorrect, it would be 11 man years. And that was simply to apprise Schlesinger, and Colby, who had never been in counterintelligence, of what all this problem was about. They had the idea of transferring people back and forth and all the rest of it. And I nver chose anybody in that job as a rule who had [not] either been in the FBI or had not had very rich experience in counterintelligence. And normally I kept outside leaks to anybody in the business -- I had men who stayed with me for 11 years, Rocca was with me for 31 years, even though they went into operational situations abroad and returned, and so on.

And I say this to you, because here was an IG, and Inspector General, who had had a very lofty mission in Germany, where we used to have two or 300 new people --

Mr. Schwarz. Was this Mr. Ermine?

Mr. Angleton. No, he was never brought. He was Gordon Stewart -- and he is retired -- a very able man, and a fine executive. And I mean this sincerely. He is one of the really top-notch men.

But he as to undertake this burden. And it was a farce in terms -- so he would talk to people and get their views and so on.

When I went to the former Chief of the Soviet Division, who was then stationed in Paris -- and this is only hearsay, I never read the report -- the former Chief of the Soviet Division stated, when I look back it, perhaps I have given too much latitude to my subordinates. And he wouldn't say yea or nay, but he withdrew his very firm statement of the past that this man was an agent provocateur.

Mr. Schwarz. Did the review concern in any way the handling of the matter with the Warren Commission?

Mr. Angleton. No, not to my knowledge. I mean, this may be something. I don't think I have evern seen the review -- in fact, I don't know whether the review was ever put in the paper. But I mention it simply so that you don't get the idea that it was just the CIA staff that had this view. This was a view that was shared by numbers of people who had dealings with Nosenko. And I think the greatest authority of all is Golitzen himself, who was in the KGB, and who knew

everything. And he lived there for 16 or 18 years of his life.

Mr. Schwarz. Earlier you mentioned that you put Mr. Harvey in touch with the Israeli's during the Cuban business. And we have had a lot of testimony about Mr. Harvey, so we are moderately well aware of his activities.

Mr. Angleton. I am sorry.

Mr. Schwarz. We know who Mr. Harvy is and we have had a fair amount of testimony about some of the things he had done. What was the connection between him and the Israeli's during the Cuban business?

Mr. Angleton. I will put it very briefly --

Senator Tower. What is the Cuban business specifically?

Mr. Schwarz. The witness used the expression Cuban business. I guess I should ask first, what do you mean by the Cuban business, and second, what is the connection between Mr. Harvey and the Israeli's on this matter?

Mr. Kirbow. You are really asking, what is the importance of putting him in touch with them in relation to Cuba?

Mr. Angleton. Bill Harvey was put in charge of taking over the Cuban business, the Cuban business being the Clandestine Services activity into Cuba. Now, what struck me, not having had any part of the Bay of Pigs, because of differences with Bissell, was that it seemed to me that both the Cubans and the Soviets knew everything that was being

planned. In other words, they had the thing penetrated, and it was foredoomed.

Mr. Schwarz. Through the exile community in Miami?

Mr. Angleton. No, through Soviet agents and everything, and so on, there was no cover or second investigation or anything.

So when Bill took over in the Cuban business, then I decided that since we were very close friends that I would try to help him out by getting him a source totally unknown to everybody. And I went to the Israeli's. And I had them assign a man to Havana, whom I happened to know very well. He was born in Bulgaris. He can speak Russian and the Balkan countries' languages. He is today their senior man on Soviet intelligence. He was a young officer in the days I am speaking of. And he was sent to Havana, which meant that here he was -- and the communications were from him in a one time pattern, I mean total security, from Havana to Tel Aviv, to me, and from me to Bill. And no one knew of his existence or his identify, except Harvey and myself, and of course, Dick Helms.

Mr. Schwarz. McCone?

Mr. Angleton. I can't remember whether -- yes, McCone would have know, but he wouldn't have been interested.

What I am trying to say is, he knew.

Mr. Kirbow. Helms knew because he was DDP --

Mr. Angleton. He knew, because even before I went into this I told him what I was going to do, and he agreed, and so on.

And also I wanted a person, because there was a radio going to be put into Havana, and let somebody say we need a radio in Havana, or drop some men in. And then the point is, I get the radio to Tel Aviv, and to Havana and then put it someplace, and then tell him, you go to such and such a place and find the radio, and then have some men come in and call some men to make contact, with the view that I couldn't trust the whole setup.

So for many a long period of time this worked perfectly. This individual established his cover. They only had two or three people in the Embassy there. He would go to a Hungarian restaurant where the Soviet officers would also go. And he would spot one of the waiters or a headwater who was Jewish and it wouldn't be long before he would say, you are from the Israeli Embassy, and pretty soon one thing led to another, and his production was without question the greatest production there was.

Well, it got so complex in names and geography, and so on, that is when I came to the point that I brought Harvey together secretly with this individual, the only person I put in touch was an Israeli in this context. So later on the Soviets come out with the statement, is Bill Harvey on the

with. It looks big today to you, but when you think of what the Agency's efforts were at that time in the Miami base with all the boats and the biggest Navy in the world, and all the rest, a little thing involving one man was not a thing that you went up and made a fuss to Mr. McCone about.

Mr. Schwarz. Did you know Mr. Harvey pretty well, was he someone you knew?

Mr. Angleton. Very well indeed. In fact, I just called him the other day, his mother died.

Mr. Schwarz. I heard that.

Did you know anything about his use of underworld figures in connection with --

Mr. Angleton. I know the allegations.

Mr. Schwarz. At the time did you know of that?

Mr. Angleton. I only know one incident.

Mr. Schwarz. Okay.

Mr. Angleton. Simply the Bureau, the FBI, ran a surveillance. And Sam Papich, who was the Liaison Officer of the FBI, who is now Head of the Criminal Commission in Mexico, was at my house around 10 o'clock at night. And the Washington Field Office or Headquarters Miami located Papich at my house. They were absolutely boiling, because they had surveiled the Mafia all the way from California to National Airport, and he had got off the plane and was met by a man who was the physical description of Bill to a tee. And they

thought it was Bill. And they were checking with Papich. what to do.

Mr. Schwarz. That was Mr. Roselli, was it?

Mr. Angleton. I think it was.

Mr. Kirbow. And the Bill you speak of here is Bill Harvey?

Mr. Angleton. Bill Harvey.

So I could get the gist of Bill's questions to them. And I told him -- I made a motion to put his hand over the phone and not to let them discuss it. And I said, tell them not to do anything until they hear from you.

And that is what he told them, he said, stand down on this and I will be back in touch.

And then Bill told me the whole story in detail of how he had gone over from California and followed him in this thing, and how Harvey had put him in his car and he went off.

Mr. Schwarz. That was in 1973 shortly before Mr. Harvey went to Rome?

Mr. Angleton. It wasn't shortly before, it was, I think quite a long time before.

So then I told Sam, I said, look, let's go very easy on this -- because I didn't know anything about Bill's connection with the Mafia and all that, but I did know him well enough to know that he was not a frivolous man, and that this thing happened, and keep in mind that ex-FBI men, contrary to public opinion, were not very much liked by Mr. Hoover when they left

the FBI.

So I called Bill's house, and I asked his wife, is Bill around?

And she said, no, he is out to dinner tonight.

And I said, look, we have some very serious trouble. Would you please tell me where I can locate him.

And she said, he is at Duke Zeibert's. And I called Duke Zeibert's and I managed to get him. And I turned the phone over to Papich, because I did not want to be on the record showing that this was Angleton, et cetera.

And Papich talked to Bill, and actually I didn't hear the discussion. It was something about, I will see you tomorrow.

And Sam told the surveillance and all the other people to forget it, and the Headquarters would take over.

And that is my knowledge, direct knowledge of what Anderson and everybody else has stated.

Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Angleton, to your specific knowledge did Bill ever attempt to use the excellent contact he had in Havana to carry out the mission of eliminating the leader down there, or try to get any help out of him in that regard?

Mr. Angleton. He knows that I would have cut his throat.

Mr. Kirbow. That would have jeopardized your entire contact with the Israeli's?

Mr. Angleton. Yes sir.

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Senator Tower. We will take a recess for about two minutes while we go up and vote.

(A short recess was taken)

Senator Tower. On the record.

Mr. Schwarz.

Mr. Schwarz. I don't have anything more.

Senator Tower. You have read this, and Szulc says in this galley -- this is a galley of the Szulc article in Penthouse:

"Although the details of the Israeli nuclear enterprise are still top secret, it is known that in the wake of the 1956 Suez war, the Eisenhower Administration resolved to provide Israel with all possible help in developing an atomic weapon. The Israelis had the theoretical knowledge, but they needed technological support at their Dimona nuclear research center in the Negev Desert.

"According to the top intelligence sources, the CIA was charged with the responsibility of providing this support to the Israelis."

Do you have knowledge that the CIA was charged with such responsibilities?

Mr. Angleton. Absolutely to the contrary.

Senator Tower. "--Angleton directed the effort?"

Mr. Angleton. False.

Senator Tower. That it totally false?

Mr. Angleton. That is totally false.

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"Several nuclear scientists were secretly sent to Israel to work with Dimona scientists."

Mr. Angleton. False. I will interject here that the French sent 400 as a matter of the original deal with the Israeli's to Dimona.

Senator Tower. The reference here is to nuclear weaponry. And this means sent by the CIA, as I interpret it.

Mr. Angleton. It is false.

Senator Tower. "The most important of them, according to intelligence sources, was a British-born physicist, now an American citizen working for the US Government in Washington, with special and esoteric ties to the CIA."

Mr. Angleton. No. The allegation is false.

Senator Tower. The answer to your previous question would cover that one, too, I assume.

"Persons close to Angleton have confirmed this account in recent interviews. Reflecting Angleton's own position, however, they have denied assertions from other sources that the CIA team made fissinoable material -- plutonimum -- available to the Israelies from United States stocks."

Mr. Schwarz. As far as your are concerned is that statement right or wrong?

Mr. Angleton. I am saying, when he says deny it, I deny it.

Senator Tower. I think it was taken care of in that

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second paragraph, is where all the questions are raised.

Really, the CIA would be hard put to transfer any fissionable materials without the knowledge of the Atomic Energy Commission, would it not?

Mr. Angleton. Sir, I can assure you that the CIA -- I don't really know what the word fissionable means anymore. There is so much use of the atomic energy. We have atomic battery --

Senator Tower. By fissionable materials, I think the reference here is that could be converted to weapons.

Mr. Angleton. I just don't categorically -- in my whole history in the CIA, nothing ever involved fissionable material except intelligence about it or speculations regarding leakages and so forth.

Senator Tower. In other words, the CIA doesn't have control over any stocks of fissionable materials independently?

Mr. Angleton. No.

Senator Tower. And therefore the CIA could not acquire such materials except through the knowledge of the Atomic Energy Commission?

Mr. Angleton. That is right -- I hate to nit pick, but I want to simply state that there was a problem in the Agency once where you have, say, somebody simply approach you and state, I have access to fissionable materials, and therefore if it is a covert thing, and it raises a big policy question,

how do we deal with those kinds of cases, where someone allegedly, a confidence man, or whatnot, who wants to sell you the stuff? The purpose then was to penetrate, or try to penetrate. And I wonder if there wasn't a question at one stage as to what we do about it, and what the dangers would be if we use the diplomatic pouch, and there are thousands of questions. And it did happen in the Far East. And it was a false case, confidential case. But it did happen. There was an offer to sell us atomic fissionable material or something. But my point is, there has never been initiative to my knowledge, or an interest of the CIA in any shape or form wanting any fissionable material.

Senator Tower. Dave.

Mr. Aaron. Two small points. Mr. Szulc said that "In effect Mr. Angleton said at one point that should I surface Mr. Mann's name, Dr. Mann's name, he may go as far as to commit suicide."

Did you ever say that to Mr. Szulc?

Mr. Angleton. I don't think I said it to him. But in the back of my mind -- after I left you -- was what I think I told you -- and maybe I didn't tell you, maybe I told Colby, that is what bothers me -- the Royal Canadian Mounted Police still have an open espionage case in which a report of theirs alleges that either Dr. Mann being present or something that someone tried to cut his throat in Philby's house in

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Washington, when Philby was stationed there. Now, whether we had the report or not I don't know. So I am a little confused as to that statement. Because I don't think the question of using Mann's name came up other than in the context of the allegation that Mann was sent by me, and would this mean, if it came out in terms of the Head of Services, who had called for phrases, British, French, et cetera, and they would have this confirmation, one, do they know anything about my Israeli activities now, and then the most damaging would be the entire information on Mann and Philby, et cetera.

Mr. Aaron. Let me just read one other segment of his testimony: "Angleton said after recounting the story of the transfer of atomic technology Mr. Szulc went on and said, Angleton said that he was rather taken back by this information, said that in effect he could confirm it with corrections: one, the timeframe was wrong, that it was not the early '60's, but indeed the late '50's after the Suez war, and number two, that as far as he was concerned there was not delivered by the CIA, or anyone to his knowledge any fissionable material such as plutonium or other material."

Mr. Angleton. I don't follow that at all.

Mr. Aaron. Did you make those two corrections?

Mr. Angleton. I don't understand what you are saying.

Mr. Aaron. Did you make those two corrections?

Mr. Angleton. I don't understand what you are saying.

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Senator Tower. He is reading -- actually what he read a little earlier to you was in terms of trying to bring out that you did not agree with his story, that you did not confirm the validity of it.

Mr. Angleton. That part is correct. But I am not following this last part you are reading.

Mr. Aaron. Let me show it to you and you read it.

Mr. Schwarz. Would you identify the page and the line?

Mr. Aaron. The page is page 40, beginning at line 19 and running to the end of the page.

Mr. Angleton. That said in effect he could confirm it, that is the "it" business?

Mr. Aaron. Start back further and get the general story.

Mr. Angleton. This is false, on page 40, from line 8, "Mr. Angleton told me that essentially this information was correct," that is absolutely false.

And I never made any such statement that I could confirm it -- lines 19 and 20, "Angleton said he was really taken back and in effect he could confirm the two corrections." That is false.

Mr. Aaron. I think that covers it.

Mr. Angleton. And this is false: "one or more distinguished pure scientists or physicists whose services were available to the US Government", that is totally false.

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Mr. Aaron. Let me ask one last question.

Mr. Angleton. When I say technical assistance, that is a quite different matter.

Mr. Kirbow. You do not mean technical assistance in the nuclear field whatever?

Mr. Angleton. He knew what I was stating was this stuff that has come out in volumes of Sadat's resume of CIA's help to the Israelis, which was accurate.

Senator Tower. By technical assistance here, as I understand it, he means technical assistance and nuclear weapons development.

Mr. Angleton. That is right. And that is deliberately on his part a misstatement of the fact. And that is what I am trying to say.

Senator Tower. He did admit to technical assistance in terms of intelligence?

Mr. Angleton. No, it wasn't a question of my admitting, I told him that it was well-known that in the whole field of ELINT and many things, that we have worked closely with the Israelis.

Senator Tower. But not specifically, technical assistance and nuclear weapon development?

Mr. Angleton. That subject wasn't in existence.

Mr. Aaron. Mr. Angleton, is it possible that one source of this story could be alleged operations by the Israelis

intelligence service in the US in regard to the efforts to acquire nuclear technology or material?

Mr. Angleton. No.

Let me just state my own feeling about some of this. After he talked to me about having all those great sources which were better than Hirsch's, he said, I also have talked to Israeli intelligence. Well, I knew right away that that was a lie. I said, after 22 years' work with some people, they would have been having me out of bed at 3 in the morning. In other words, in 22 years I have never known them to withhold anything germain to our common activity. So that for American jounalists to go and try to pump things out of me regarding the subject, he wouldn't have got home before -- that is the first thing. That is the fact. And he said this Israeli fellow said something about, something I don't discuss, or words to that effect, I can't remember that part of it.

So there isn't much more to say about that.

Mr. Aaron. Were there Israeli intelligence efforts in the US in the 1960's or at any time aimed at acquiring either nuclear technology or information that would have a bearing on this story?

Mr. Angleton. There have been many efforts by many countries to acquire technical knowledge in this country, and that doesn't exclude the Israelis.

Mr. Kirbow. Do you have specific knowledge of instances

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while you were employed with the Agency, Mr. Angleton? I believe that might be a fair question.

Senator Tower. In your capacity as Head of Counter-intelligence, did it ever come to your attention -- did you ever have any certain knowledge that Israeli agents were actually trying to acquire nuclear secrets in the US, atomic secrets?

Mr. Angleton. Do I have to respond to that?

Mr. Kirbow. Would you like to go off the record a moment, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Tower. We can go off the record.

(Off the record discussion)

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Senator Mathias. Mr. Chairman, I would suggest that perhaps we defer that subject for the moment. I am sure we will be meeting with Mr. Angleton again.

Senator Tower. Then, too, we can get the FBI matter in the meantime.

I have just a couple of questions that I would appreciate it if Mr. Angleton would give us his evaluations as an expert on. And they go back to his testimony relative to the Kennedy assassination.

As I recall, you said that immediately after the assassination Golitzen on his own initiative communicated with you and advised you that it was normal practice for a defector who had a military background to be processed in Department 13?

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Mr. Angleton. Interrogated, or processed.

Senator Mathias. And that the implication certainly of this was that Oswald was an ex-Marine, and had been through this process, and that therefore at least that he might have been acting within the context of the Soviet plan, is that right?

Mr. Angleton. That is the thrust of what he was trying to say. His English is such that it is very difficult.

Senator Mathias. I understand. But then some years later -- my recollection is that you said it was in 1967 or 1969 -- you learned that the KGB had spent six month of employment of their top operators in the investigation of the Kennedy assassination, and wouldn't this fact in your mind negate the implication of the original Golitzen call or that they were involved?

Mr. Angleton. I want to congratulate you, because that man is a man who is also a suspect of Nosenko.

Senator Mathias. You mean in 1967?

Mr. Angleton. Just to show you the ground you are treading on, Golitzen gave us information regarding the penetration of our own organization. And we worked down to an identity. And the FBI disagreed with us. And I am talking about not a few minutes, but several weeks and months of work. And the Bureau's attitude was, you have got the wrong man, and the allegation therefore does not affect the CIA, and we

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advise that you send it to the Army.

And I might add, the man who wrote that memorandum was the Burt Turner I mentioned who was one of the competent FBI analysts. So it was in limbo. And we stated that "X" was the penetration agent, and the Bureau refused to accept that. And in 1967 a Soviet -- on whom we had a dossier on this thing, because he was once stationed in India, and therefore we knew who he was, and all the rest of it -- with an unknown coming to us as Nosenko was, he was a real man, we had years of surveillance on him, and so on. And he came, and he alleged -- and he was a TDC, temporary duty in Washington here -- and he established contact with the first Mrs. Helms. And eventually I was called to take the case. And he stated that among his missions to the US was to effect the redefection or the return to the Soviet Union of a man, and that man was the man whom we had identified as a Soviet agent. And he went into the whole background, that this man was one of the highest grade illegals that they had ever had, and he was in our Agency.

So this had a tremendous impact on Burt Turner, because he was one of the two interrogating officers. And I can't talk to you about professional pride, but for a man of his competence to have done it the wrong way, that hurt.

So I had a question injected, which was, what do you know about George Blake?

Geo Blake

And then his response was, he says, we think he is dead.

Now, hwere is a man who is supposed to be Special Assistant to the Head of Counterintelligence in KGB, whose mother was a secretary to Litvinov, and he comes therefore from the aristocracy, as Nosenko does, because his father was the Minister of Maritime Affairs. And there is a statue of Nosenko's father. And Golitzen had told us that men chosen for very dangerous missions of penetration and duplicity came from the aristocracy. Everyone trusted them, and their fathers and their families are heroes of the Soviet Union.

So here was this man who said as to Blake, we think he is dead.

Two to three weeks later is when Blake escaped from Scrubb's Woods to the Soviet Union. Now, if he had come to the US to exfiltrate as the Special Assistant to the Head of Counterintelligence, to exfiltrate a person who worked in the West as an illegal from the end of World War II, and gradually worked into us, why wouldn't he have known the exfiltartion plans of George Blake, which would have been simultaneous, because he was a Headquarters man here on TDC.

So we handled him for six or seven weeks.

And some of the most telling parts of the interrogation was that when he went back to the Soviet Union he would have access to archives. And what was on our mind, and what cryptonym that we wanted him to work up -- and this would

relate to the third part of the damage part on Golitzen -- what did Golitzen know that they did not know he knew? What agents in the West could be under our control as a result of Golitzen's disclosures regarding those things?

And you can see the tremendous quality this man had of almost getting from our man those four or five crytonyms, which would have told them what they wanted to know, because there are cases they are not sure whether he knows or doesn't know, and so on. And these are officials, and so on.

So he wasn't given that. He was given stuff that was sort of medium low level stuff, you couldn't call it chicken feed -- but we never told him we disbelieved in him. And he said, if you do those things for me, I have an opportunity, because of my mother and so on, to become Head of the American Department of the KGB.

And the other thing he wanted, was, we took him to the Soviet Agency and we came out later for contacts, and he stated there was a telegram there, and he had been requested to acquire all the information possible on the whereabouts of Golitzen and Nosenko. And I was actually in Wisconsin. And I called my Deputy long distance and I said, if there is any proposal put up by that individual that would expose -- and I use the crytonym name of Golitzen -- don't.

A week later is when he got to Moscow and he sent a cable to tell us that he can give them word on everything on

Golitzen.

Coming back to what you stated, with our litmus paper and with our analysis of him, we treated him as a walk-in, as a part of the thing to confirm Nosenko's bona fides, and the build-up. And he is the one who gave the full description of the fact that for six months the place was immobilized for this investigation, of all the high level all over the works, is the way he put it.

Senator Mathias. You contrasted the way that the Russians treat a returned defector, ahd the way we treat them. And in that connection, to your knowledge was Oswald every interrogated when he teturned from Russia?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know -- I probably would know, but I don't know whether the military -- normally that would fall within the jurisdiciton of the military, since he was a military man who defected. So I don't know the answer to that.

Senator Mathias. What about from Cuba?

Mr. Angleton. I can't answer that.

Senator Mathias. Or at any time?

Mr. Angleton. I think the Bureau interviewed him.

Senator Mathias. The Bureau, not the CIA?

Mr. Angleton. I am certain we never did, no.

Senator Mathias. But you think the FBI did?

Mr. Angleton. That is just my sensation that they did.

Senator Mathias. We will follow that up.

This is the very last question. You referred to files that are maintained on persons who have some contact with the Soviet Union and the Soviet nationals. And I would like to pursue that in a personal way.

About two years ago Arbotov was in this country, and he came to lunch in my office. And we had several members of Congress there. Would this kind of thing be a matter of record?

Mr. Angleton. If there was any technical coverage from the Soviet Embassy, then my answer would be yes.

Senator Mathias. My recollection is, he came with one person with him, whose name I don't remember.

Mr. Angleton. If the Bureau had him under surveillance, and he came here -- now, I am getting onto ground I don't know -- the newspaper said Mr. Hoover gave an order that the Hill was off-base, and when the Soviet came here he was never surveilled, and whom he saw was unknown. That is what the newspaper said. My own observation would be in any technical coverage of an installation, the door of an individual, would result in dossiers on all people who had contacts, if the man was suspect, or there is a reason.

Senator Tower. Excuse me. You are talking about a Soviet person visiting members here on the Hill?

Senator Mathias. Yes. And what I am trying to get at is the circumstances under which a file or dossier might be

opened on a member of Congress, and I offered myself as a guinea pig that Arbatov lunch as a starting point.

At this point my question is on purely hypothetical point. I plan to go next week with the Senate group which is making a parliamentary visit to Russia. And may see Arbatov in Moscow, I would assume it would be likely. Would that become a continuing entry in such a dossier as far as you know?

Mr. Angleton. We don't have any coverage in Moscow.

Senator Mathias. Is that the kind of thing that --

Mr. Angleton. We are not living in a very ideal world in the Agency. We can't even process the hard material.

Senator Mathias. Since it is a hypothetical question, let me make it even more hypothetical. Let's say our mission, instead of visiting Moscow, visits Rome or Paris or someplace, where it is very easy for you to operate. And there were meetings with Russians who were known to have visitied me in Washington. Would that be the kind of thing which would get to a Congressional file?

Mr. Angleton. No. I imagine the British MI-5, though, because of the Russians in London, would pass through liaison to us, if there was something suspicious, would pass through a report on the meeting. And we have examples where Czech defector told us about a member of Parliament, a Soviet agent, and what the cryptonum was, and how he was recruited. And you have got other cryptonyms on British members of Parliament.

that you have not then identified. We know what they passed or some of the stuff which was passed.

Senator Mathias. Assuming a file was set up on that lunch two years ago --

Mr. Angleton. The file wouldn't be set up there on the fact -- with your name on it, it would be the Soviets, and you would be buried in the file, which would probably be that thick, of that Soviet activity in the US. And there would be the fact that he was here, and that he went to New York, and he did this or that.

Senator Mathias. So that wouldn't show up in Mathias' file, that would show up in an Arbatov file?

Mr. Angleton. That is right. That is the way it is supposed to be. And the only time where I can see a file would be opened on an American Congressman or Senator would be where there was a substantial basis for opening up that file. But that wouldn't be at the initiative of the CIA, it would be a matter that would go to the FBI and the Attorney General, and then there would be somebody in the Senate or the Congress who would be contacted and notified, and so on. And I think Mr. Hoover's practice was that he would learn through his own sources that a person who is not good was going to have lunch with a Congressman or was cultivating him, and he would pick up the money -- or this is what they say. And I think this is the way he handled it -- he would simply

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call him on the phone and say, I think you should know the following, and there would be a notification that Mr. Hoover notified, et cetera. He called me once when there wasn't enough time factor for him to send a letter to me. He said, you are doing something at such and such an hour, you should know that this man is a homosexual, or so on and so on. And it may have been useful to change the course in a hurry. But it is formalized in the Bureau. When Mr. Hoover intervened on those things, it was either a question of time or a question of emphasis. But the formal part goes on regardless, if a person, regardless of who he is, is involved, or is passed a document, or comes up in a telephone tap, or any number of things, their is a record on it.

Senator Mathias. In other words, you are saying what a political friend of mine once said, that you don't get news unless you make news?

Mr. Angleton. That is one way of looking at it.

Senator Mathias. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Angleton. I want to commend you again on that question, because that fixes several things. Because if there is one thing I regret about leaving the Agency, it is the unresolved cases. And that is one of the biggest, because we know so much about that person when he was in India. And he was the most sophisticated, cultivated, high level intelligence person.

Senator Baker. What would you do, Mr. Angleton, to try to rehabilitate the Agency in particular in counterintelligence capability, since you feel that it is deteriorating, what things in particular would you do?

Mr. Angleton. My feeling is that the Agency has to go through the purgatory that -- these fires that no man would put out -- and therefore let it be shocking or whatever. And let all the political repercussions take place, and if you go to purgatory, my view is, the bigger the fires, the better. So my view is, let it all come out. And let people take the consequences. I am not a believer that an agency can have two fathers. And I don't believe in inferiors reporting on their superiors by directive. And I don't believe that the Agency below the Director has to be responsive to two authorities.

Senator Baker. What two authorities?

Mr. Angleton. I mean the Congress and the Executive. In other words, if Colby is asked, what do you know about Chile, my view is that on Chile would yoy please ask the White House. And that is what I am trying to get at, at least so then they can come back with Colby after the Executive part has told Colby what it might be. But to throw the burden on the Director to respond to a question on Chile, gives him -- he is always in that dual position. And something doesn't seem to work that way. And the lower you go in the Agency, even to

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my level, to be resonsive to more than one authoity is chaos. And I am not making any puns.

Senator Baker. To be responsible to the Congress and to the --

Mr. Angleton. The word response is what disturbs me somewhat, because the secrets that we have just been discussing here are so germain to everything in this country relating to the world balance of power and what the Soviets will strike at, and what the role of detente is. That is what I am trying to get at. The Executive -- in other words, the intelligence community has never really had a day of peace in a way. When Hoover passed away, and Gray came aboard, everyone in the intelligence community believed, now we can normalize this situation. It has never been normal before. Mr. Hoover never attended an Agency meeting. Mr. Hoover never permitted one of his representatives to go beyond this jurisdiciton question. And you cannot run a government that way, and you cannot run counterintelligence that way. So when Mr. Gray came to see Mr. Helms, and Helms called me in before him and said, what position should I take, and I said, he wants to come and normalize relations, and he wants to reestablish liaison. And he said, I wouldn't accept it form him, they are the ones who brok it off. Therefore tell him that when he has read your correspondence with Mr. Hoover, and reviewed all of that, if he feels that he is capable of handling it, that you will be

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prepared to sit down and discuss the question of liaison, because liaison is a tiny part of the question of penetration and double agents and all the rest of it.

And in fact that happened, and everybody thought, we had got a captain that didn't make admiral aboard who will settle this. And then we will have his demise.

And then you had Mr. Ruckelshaus come in as as acting Director. And then the Watergate and all of that. So there has never been a stabilizing factor in this Government as it relates to, not counterintelligence alone, but the intelligence community. And now I amstrongly opposed to professionals being Directors.

I would say that a professional Director of the Agency doesn't work, he doesn't have a basis on the outside, or the perspective. And I think the Rockefeller Commission's observations were first rate in terms of the idea of two Deputy Directors who have to be confirmed and whatnot. And I think that no directorate should be expected to follow the nuts and bolts and at the same time handle all the duties of meeting and all the rest of it and try to keep an eye inside the business.

Senator Baker. What do you think of the Rockefeller Commission reports?

Mr. Angleton. I don't see anything wrong with it.

Senator Baker. Do you think it will work?

Mr. Angleton. I really don't know this area. So I am not competent to speak or go around seeing what will happen in Congress, just on the simple question of Chile and the leakages and the damage that is done to US posture abroad, how much of it does this take?

Senator Baker. It wouldn't take many. That is an argumentative thing.

Mr. Angleton. All the cases we are discussing, in the hands of the wrong people, and our files in the hands of the wrong people, would have very decisive political impact upon our elections. That is what I mean, to be very frank about it.

Senator Baker. How would that happen?

Mr. Angleton. There are all kinds of information which, if it falls into the wrong hands or should they want to use it for their own ulterior motives, would be absolutely damaging.

Senator Tower. In other words, this information could be used by politicians as a political football?

Mr. Angleton. Precisely. But a man who would do it damages --

Senator Mathias. Would you give an example?

(Off the record discussion)

(Whereupon, at 6:05 p.m., the Committee was adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.)

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